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KOREA CONTINUES to be in the limelight  as one of a handful  of developing 
countries  that have adjusted  successfully to both the oil shocks of the 
1970s  and  the debt shock of the early 1980s.  Generally  credited  with the 
success is Korea's superior  economic  policy. In fact, Korea  now serves 
as a model for the export-oriented  strategy  of development  that multi- 
lateral  institutions  are urging  on countries  of Africa  and Latin  America. 
This paper reviews the role of policy in Korea's success thus far and 
investigates  the current  challenges  facing  government  policymakers,  in 
particular  the emergence  of a massive current  account surplus.  I 
We  have  benefited  from  the  comments  of our  discussants  and  members  of the  Brookings 
Panel.  We would  like to acknowledge  especially  the research  support  and  advice  we have 
received from Won-Am Park, Sung-Hee Jwa, and Choong-Soo Kim of  the Korea 
Development  Institute.  This  paper  was prepared  while  Yung  Chul  Park  was with  the Korea 
Development  Institute. 
1. The Korean  experience  has led to a sizable  recent  literature  of which  the following 
are among  the more  important:  Bijan  B. Aghevli  and  Jorge  Marquez-Ruarte,  "A Case of 
Successful Adjustment:  Korea's Experience During 1980-84," Occasional Paper 39 
(International  Monetary  Fund, August 1985); S. Arndt, "Policy Adjustments  Under 
Balance of Payments  Equilibrium  For the Republic  of Korea" (American  Enterprise 
Institute,  March  1986);  Bela Balassa  and  John  Williamson,  Adjusting  to Success:  Balance 
of Payments Policy in the East Asian NICs,  Policy Analyses  in International Economics 
17  (Washington,  D.C.: Institute  for  International  Economics,  June  1987);  Robert  Baldwin, 
"U.S. and Foreign  Competition  in the Developing  Countries  of the Asian Pacific  Rim," 
Working  Paper  2208  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  April  1987);  Thorkil  Casse, 
The Non-Conventional  Approach to Stability: The Case of South Korea: An Analysis  of 
Macroeconomic  Policy (Copenhagen:  Center  for Development  Research, 1985);  Susan 
Collins and A. W. Park, "Korean Macroeconomics  and Debt" (National Bureau of 
Economic  Research  and  Harvard  University,  1987);  Vittorio  Corbo  and Sang  Woo Nam, 
"Korea's Macroeconomic  Prospects and Major  Policy Issues for the Next Decade," 
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Two broad questions about Korea's experience are particularly 
interesting. 
-What  explains the Korean  adjustment  success and growth  perfor- 
mance?  Have particular  policies especially contributed  to this success? 
-Does  Korea today have a structural  external  surplus?  And should 
policy respond? 
At a time when the world's developing  countries,  especially those in 
Latin  America,  are  economically  stagnant  and  debt-laden,  Korea  enjoys 
high growth, relatively  low inflation,  and a relatively  equal  distribution 
of income.  It is the only major  debtor  that  has overcome  the debt  problem 
and has done so with a vengeance:  debt is being paid off, and the trade 
surplus  is so large  that  it invites trade  frictions. 
Since 1968, the Korean nonfactor current account has shown an 
upward  trend,  interrupted  only by the oil shocks of 1973  and 1979.  Over 
the past five years the external  balance  has been steadily  improving  and 
in 1986-87 there was a sizable surplus. That surplus  reflects a strong 
trade  performance.  Korea  is making  itself  felt in  the area  of manufactures, 
competing  with other  industrial  countries  in the U.S. market. 
Korea's success raises questions not only about how it might be 
transported  to other developing  countries  but about  how Korea affects 
and is affected by the industrialized  countries, especially the United 
States. What, for example, are the effects of dollar-yen  exchange rate 
movements  without  a corresponding  movement  in the dollar-won  rate? 
Report  DRD276  (World  Bank,  1987);  World  Bank,  "The  Recent  Macroeconomic  Evolution 
of the Republic  of Korea:  An Overview,"  Report  DRD208  (World  Bank,  February  1987); 
Charles  R. Frank,  Kwang  Suk Kim, and  Larry  E. Westphal,  Foreign Trade  Regimes  and 
Economic Development: South Korea (Columbia University Press, 1975); Wontack Hong, 
Trade,  Distortions  and  Employment  Growth  in  Korea  (Seoul:  Korea  Development 
Institute,  1979);  Anne  0. Krueger,  "The  Importance  of Economic  Policy  in Development: 
Contrasts Between Korea and Turkey," Working Paper 2195 (National Bureau of 
Economic  Research,  March  1987);  Edward  S. Mason  and  others,  The  Economic  and  Social 
Modernization  of the Republic  of Korea  (Harvard University  Press,  1980); Yung Chul 
Park, "Foreign Debt, Balance of Payments, and Growth  Prospects: The Case of the 
Republic  of Korea, 1965-1988,"  World  Development,  vol. 14  (August  1986),  pp. 1019-58; 
Tibor  Scitovsky, "Economic  Development  in Taiwan  and South Korea: 1965-1981,"  in 
Lawrence J. Lau, ed., Models ofDevelopment:A  Comparative Study ofEconomic  Growth 
in South  Korea and Taiwan  (San Francisco:  ICS Press and World  Bank, 1986),  pp. 135- 
95; World Bank,  Korea:  Development  in a Global  Context  (Washington,  D.C.:  World 
Bank, 1986); World Bank, Korea: Managing the Industrial Transition (Washington, D.C.: 
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If a won appreciation  benefits primarily  Japan  and Taiwan, which as a 
result  become more competitive  in the U.S. market,  should  the United 
States seek more specifically  targeted  policy concessions from Korea, 
such as import liberalization  in areas of particular  interest to U.S. 
exporters? How much of the present Korean surplus is due to U.S. 
overspending  and will vanish with budget  correction,  and how much, if 
any, should be eliminated  by policy action? How much pressure for 
adjustments  in their  bilateral  balance  with the United States can Korea 
and other newly industrialized  countries (NICs) expect? Will Korea 
follow  policies and  performance  of Japan,  steadily  gaining  share  in world 
markets  while maintaining  the home market  substantially  closed? 
This paper cannot answer all these questions. But it will set out 
answers to the two main questions about Korea's experience raised 
above and, in doing so, lay the groundwork  for answering  the wider 
range  of questions  one can ask about successful NICs concerning  their 
role in the world  economy in the coming  years. 
The  paper  falls broadly  into three  parts.  The  first  part  reviews Korean 
growth  history  and  the structure  of the economy. The second part  offers 
explanations  for Korea's superior  performance.  A central  point is that 
Korean  wages are exceptionally  low by international  standards,  given 
the skill  level of the labor  force, and  hence provide  continuing  scope for 
trade success. Finally, we argue that Korea may well tend toward a 
structural  surplus.  But we also argue  that dramatic  government  action 
to eliminate  the surplus  would be premature.  Uncertainties  about the 
world  economy, about  domestic  labor  market  developments,  and  about 
the forthcoming  U.S. budget adjustments  point to the possibility of a 
significant  decline in the Korean current  account surplus. Given that 
possibility  and the obvious difficulty  of reversing  real appreciation  or 
expansion once it has occurred, we conclude that policy initiatives 
should  be limited  to selective import  liberalization.  But we do see room 
for a major  trade  initiative  in the direction  of free trade  with the United 
States. 
A Review of Long-Term Performance 
During  the past thirty-five  years Korean gross national  product  has 
increased  more than sevenfold. Although  the country  remains  poor by 392  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 1.  Comparative Levels of Real per Capita Income, Various Years,  1955-85a 
Index,  United  States  =  100 
Country  1955  1960  1970  1977  1985 
Korea  12  12  17  23  31 
Brazil  15  18  18  24  23 
Portugal  19  23  32  40  37 
Spain  31  33  49  53  48 
Israel  32  41  52  53  48 
Japan  23  33  64  67  77 
Source: Robert Summers  and Alan Heston, "Improved  International  Comparisons  of Real Product  and Its 
Composition:  1950-1980,"  Review of Income atid Wealth,  vol. 30 (June 1984),  pp. 207-62. Data for 1985 were 
provided  by the authors. 
a. Real gross domestic  income  per capita  in each country  (adjusted  for changes  in the terms  of trade)  relative  to 
U.S. gross domestic  income  per capita  in each year. 
comparison  with the industrialized  world, it has placed itself among  the 
top developing countries,  just behind Singapore  and Taiwan and not 
much behind Portugal.  Table 1 shows a comparison  of real per capita 
gross domestic product  using purchasing-power-adjusted  measures of 
income. The purchasing-power  adjustment  is essential  for international 
comparisons  because systematic  differences  in relative  prices  otherwise 
lead to an underestimate  of the real income of poor countries.  The U.S. 
level of real income per capita in each year serves as a benchmark  for 
comparisons.2 
Korean  relative growth  started  only in the 1960s. Until then real per 
capita income growth  paralleled  that in the United States, but was not 
striking.  But even with extremely high growth rates over an extended 
period  the level of real  income today in Korea is less than  a third  that of 
the United States and  does not yet match  that  of Spain  or Portugal.  The 
relative  level of per capita  income in Japan  and Korea  has stayed nearly 
constant since 1960. Korea today has the same 40 percent of Japan's 
standard  of living that it had in 1960.  But it has already  overtaken  and 
moved  far  ahead  of Brazil,  Latin  America's  strongest  growth  performer. 
Table 2 summarizes  the growth and transformation  of Korea since 
the early 1960s.  Emerging  clearly  from  these data  are  five characteristics 
of the economy: 
a sustained,  exceptionally  high  growth  rate of output; 
a structural  transformation  of the economy, in terms  of both output 
2. These purchasing-power-adjusted  real  income  measures  take into account  the fact 
that  in poor  countries  the real  prices  of services  tend  to be low and  that,  accordingly,  GNP 
in dollars  is not an appropriate  measure  of the actual  standard  of living. Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  393 
Table 2.  Macroeconomic and Structural Patterns, Korea, Various Periods,  1963-86 
Percent 
Measure  1963-73  1974-80  1981-86 
Annual inflation ratea  16.6  21.9  6.0 
Annual real GNP growth rate  9.7  7.2  8.7 
Manufacturing product  19.7  14.1  10.0 
Share in GNP 
Agricultureb  35.2  20.9  15.6 
Manufacturingc  15.7  28.0  33.1 
Other  49.1  51.1  5i.3 
Share in employment 
Agricultureb  54.5  41.2  28.6 
Manufacturingc  12.6  21.5  23.5 
Other  32.8  37.2  47.9 
Exports  as share of GNP  14.5  30.6  38.6 
Taxes  as share of GNP  11.8  16.8  19.2 
Investment  as share of GNP  22.0  30.4  30.2 
Foreign saving as share of GNP  8.3  7.2  4.3 
Source: Bank of Korea,  Econiomic Statistics  Yearbook, various issues. 
a. GDP  deflator. 
b. Includes  forestry  and fishing. 
c. Includes  mining. 
and employment, with a substantial  decline in agriculture,  a rise in 
manufacturing,  and a growing  importance  of trade; 
-a  significant  increase  in public  sector resources; 
-a  sustained  high  rate  of investment;  and 
-large,  but  declining,  external  financing. 
A striking  characteristic  of the Korean  economy is the growing  share 
of exports in GNP and the changing  composition of its trade. Table 3 
shows that in little more than twenty years Korea moved from being a 
commodity  exporter to being a net importer  of commodities and an 
exporter  of manufactures. 
The reorientation  of the economy toward  trade  is equally  apparent  in 
import  penetration  and export ratios. In manufacturing,  the ratio of 
exports  to total  production  increased  during  1970-83  from 11  percent  to 
21 percent, while the import  content of the m-anufacturing  sector rose 
from 17.3 percent to 22.2 percent. The ratio of imports to domestic 
production  in the manufacturing  sector  has declined  over the past  fifteen 
years  from  almost  20 percent  to only 15  percent.3 
3. The import  ratio  is defined  as the ratio  of imported  intermediate  goods to domestic 
production.  The  data  come  from  Bank  of Korea,  Input-Ouitput  Tables,  various  issues. 394  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 3.  Composition of Exports and Imports, Korea,  1962, 1970, 1985 
Percent  of total 
1962  1970  1985 
Indiustry  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Commodities  and processed  foodsa  75.6  33.7  21.5  37.3  5.1  17.5 
Mineral fuelsb  5.0  7.3  1.0  6.9  3.1  23.6 
Chemicalsc  1.8  22.4  1.4  8.3  3.1  9.0 
Manufactured goodsd  17.6  36.6  76.1  47.6  88.7  49.9 
Machinery and transport equipment  2.6  16.5  7.4  29.7  37.6  34.2 
Source:  Bank of  Korea,  Economic  Planning Board (EPB),  Maijor Statistics  of Korean Economy,, various issues. 
Numbers  may not add to totals because  of rounding. 
a.  Standard industrial trade classification  (SITC) 0-2  and 4. 
b.  SITC 3. 
c.  SITC 5. 
d.  SITC 6-9. 
Finally, scarcely  less remarkable  than  Korea's transformation  is that 
it took place under  conditions  of relatively  modest inflation.  In the past 
twenty  years  inflation  averaged  9 percent  a year  and  reached  a maximum 
of 30  percent.  The  inflation  was comparable  to that  of the  United  Kingdom 
or Italy, very remote from the Latin American  experience of inflation 
rates of 100  percent, as in Mexico, or the 1,000  percent  plus of Brazil  or 
Argentina.  Moreover,  for the past few years inflation  has been less than 
3 percent. 
Explaining Successful Growth and Transformation 
Economists  and  policymakers  seeking  to apply  the lessons of Korea's 
success to poorly performing  countries in Latin America should note 
that the recipe is definitely not simply "hands off, give free reign to 
market  forces." Government  intervention  has been intense, and  restric- 
tions on trade and capital flows are the rule. Thus if any general 
description  is appropriate,  it is that  the government  has for the most part 
run  a tight  ship, sailing  very close to the wind. In the appendix  we review 
the main  phases of Korean  economic  history  and  the directions  of policy 
since the 1950s. In this section we identify policies that have spurred 
high  growth. 
BROAD  EXPLANATIONS  FOR  KOREA  S  GROWTH 
In identifying the differences or similarities between Korea and 
developing  countries  in  Latin  America,  a summary  comes easily. Korea's Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  395 
Table 4.  Macroeconomic Performance, Korea and LDCs, Selected Periods,  1967-85 
Percent per year 
Middle  Latin 
Measure  Africa  Asia  Eu,opea  East  America  Korea 
Inflation 
1967-76  8.5  9.4  9.0  8.7  24.5  7.2 
1977-85  17.2  7.9  25.1  14.1  77.6  11.1 
Real GDP growth 
1967-76  5.0  5.2  6.0  9.3  5.9  10.3 
1977-85  1.9  6.5  3.1  0.7  2.6  6.4 
Sources:  International Monetary  Fund,  World Economic  Ouitlook, various  issues,  and EPB,  Major Statistics  of 
Korean Econo,ny,  various  issues.  Averages  of country growth  rates are weighted  by the average  U.S.  dollar value 
of GDPs over  the preceding three years. 
a.  Developing  countries  in Europe,  that is,  Southern Europe including Portugal, Spain, Greece,  and Yugoslavia. 
labor  force is better  trained  and  works harder.  Its people save more  and 
borrow wisely. Policies are perhaps as activist but not grossly mis- 
directed.  Budget  deficits  are  moderate,  and  the real  exchange  rate  rarely 
gets overvalued. The differences add up to a performance  strikingly 
better than that of Latin America, though  not that of other South East 
Asian countries,  as table  4 shows. 
Korea  has not been without  macroeconomic  difficulties.  In 1980-81, 
in the aftermath  of the second oil shock, inflation  increased sharply, 
output  declined,  and  the external  balance  was in disarray.  Korea  is also 
a major  LDC debtor. But, unlike the less successful countries, Korea 
never allowed these problems to get far out of hand, or for long. 
Adjustment  invariably  came rapidly, before economic agents became 
accustomed  and  adjusted  to instability  and inflation. 
Economists  have tried  to come up  with  a generalized  recipe  for  growth 
that might explain why some countries prosper in spite of adversity 
while others do not. In an authoritative  review of what is known about 
growth successes, Dervis and Petri compare a group of seven high- 
growth  countries  (Taiwan,  Korea, Brazil, Thailand,  Portugal,  Greece, 
and Yugoslavia)  with a group  of thirteen  less successful cases, ranging 
from  Turkey  down to the Ivory Coast. For the period 1965-85  the more 
successful group shows annual per capita growth of 5.0 percent, as 
against  only 2.5 percent  for the less successful group. Dervis and Petri 
conclude that no single explanation  sets winners apart  from the rest. 
They note: 
Countries  that  grew  rapidly  throughout  the past two decades have had  to excel 
in several  dimensions.  Early  on, high  rates  of investment  and  favorable  domestic 396  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Figure 1.  Baumol's Catching-Up Hypothesis 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  William J.  Baumol,  "Productivity  Growth,  Convergence,  and Welfare: 
What the Long-Run Data  Show,"  American  Economic  Reviewt',  vol.  76 (December  1986), fig. 3. The data are from 
Robert  Summers  and Alan  Heston,  "Improved  International  Comparisons  of  Real  Product  and  Its  Composition: 
1950-1980,"  Review  of Income  and  Wealth, vol.  30 (June  1984), pp. 207-62. 
a.  Adjusted for changes  in the terms of trade as in Summers and Heston. 
preconditions  were the most significant  correlates  with success. Between 1978 
and 1979  fast growth  called for high  investment  and  frugal  fiscal  policies. After 
1979, debt and especially the financing  of debt through  high exports became 
paramount.4 
Baumol has offered the hypothesis  that rapid growth is a reflection of 
catching  up.'  He  argues,  drawing  on  the  hundred-year  evidence  of 
4.  Kemal  Dervis and Peter A. Petri, "The Macroeconomics  of Successful Develop- 
ment:  What  are the Lessons?" in Stanley  Fischer,  ed., NBER  Macroeconomics  Annual, 
1987  (MIT  Press, 1987),  pp. 211-54. 
5. See William  J. Baumol, "Productivity  Growth,  Convergence  and Welfare:  What 
the Long-Run  Data Show," American  Econonmic Review, vol. 76 (December 1986), 
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Table  5. Sources  of Economic  Growth  in Korea, 1963-82 
Percent  per year 
Measure  1963-72  1972-82 
Real GDP  8.2  8.0 
Total factor input  4.2  5.6 
Labor  3.1  3.5 
Capital  1.1  2.1 
Output  per unit of input  4.0  2.4 
Sources:  Korea  Development  Institute,  Quarterly Economic  Review  (Seoul:  KDI,  1986), p.  33; and K.  S.  Kim 
and J. K. Park, Souirces of Economic  Growth in Korea:  1963-1982  (Seoul:  KDI,  1985), pp. 61-62. 
industrial  countries, that there is a tendency toward convergence:  the 
countries  with the lowest levels of productivity  have the highest  rates  of 
growth.  An essential  ingredient  for their  high  growth  is the ability  to take 
advantage  of existing knowledge  and technology. Since that process is 
subject  to diminishing  returns, convergence ultimately  sets in and the 
catching-up  countries  slow to the common rate of long-term  growth  of 
the most advanced  countries. 
Figure 1 shows per capita  income in 1960  and income growth  during 
1960-81  for a group  of middle-income  countries  ranging  from Lesotho 
to Greece, Portugal,  and Spain. Although  Korea supports  the Baumol 
hypothesis,  the entire  sample  does not. 
Absent a single broad  explanation  for growth, we turn  to look more 
closely at the individual building blocks of  Korea's success.  As  a 
preliminary,  we briefly review Denison-style growth accounting for 
Korea. Table 5 reports estimates of the sources of growth in Korea 
between 1963 and 1982. More than half the growth rate of output is 
explained  by increases in factor inputs, labor and capital. Slightly  less 
than half is due to growth of total factor productivity,  which depends 
mainly  on scale economies and  advances  in knowledge. 
In our  view, the cornerstone  of Korean  growth  is a highly  trained  and 
productive  labor  force whose wages are low by international  standards. 
Korea's labor force is a precondition  for the high rates of investment 
and  capacity  expansion  that make  the export  expansion  possible. 
THE  LABOR  FORCE  AND  WAGES 
The broadest,  vaguest explanation  for Korea's success draws  atten- 
tion to the people, the extent of their work effort, their  education, and 
the distribution  of income among  them. 398  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 6.  Hours of Work in Manufacturing,1960-85 
Hours per week 
United 
P'eriod  Korea  Greece  Mexico  Japan  States  Germany 
1960-69  55.5a  43.9  45.9  45.4  40.6  44.0 
1970-79  51.8  42.9  45.6  41.1  40.1  42.1 
1980-85  53.8  39.1  46.1  41.2  40.0  40.9 
Source:  International Labor Office,  Yearbook of Labor Statistics,  various issues. 
a.  Average  for  1963-69. 
Table 6 shows weekly work hours in Korea and a number  of other 
countries. The simple fact is that Koreans work longer. The Korean 
work week, which has actually  increased  since the 1970s,  is 35 percent 
longer than that in industrialized  countries and 17 percent longer than 
that in Mexico. The extent of work effort is described  by Hong in the 
following  terms:  "Even nowadays,  a typical  Korean  white collar  worker 
leaves home before  7 o'clock in the morning  and  leaves his office after  8 
o'clock in the evening  every day. .  ..  He usually  works  late on Saturday 
afternoons and, if  something goes  wrong, has to  go  to  work on 
Sunday. " 6 
During the several decades of Japanese occupation before World 
War II, Korean citizens suffered from a poor educational  system. In 
response,  they placed  an  enormous  value  on education  in  the  reconstruc- 
tion period  following  independence  and the Korean  War.  The commit- 
ment  to education  has, if anything,  increased  over the years.  The average 
education  level of employed males was 7.2 years in 1960,  9.3 years in 
1970,  and 10.3  years  in 1980.7  Table  7 shows an international  comparison 
of enrollment  levels in secondary  schools and  higher  education.  In 1960 
Korea already  exceeded by a substantial  margin  the average  for upper- 
middle-income  countries. By 1983  the country  was well on the way to 
educational  standards  of industrial  countries. 
6.  See Wontack Hong, "Export-Oriented  Growth of Korea: A Possible Path to 
Advanced  Economy," Seminar  Paper  382  (Institute  for International  Economics,  Stock- 
holm  University,  1984). 
7. These  data  refer  to male  employees  in  the nonagricultural  sector.  The  corresponding 
numbers  for  the entire  labor  force  are  4.2, 6.4, and  8.0. The data  come  from  K. S. Kim  and 
J. K. Park, Sources of Economic Growth in Korea: 1963-1982 (Seoul: Korea Development 
Institute,  1985),  p. 18. Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  399 
Table 7.  Educational Enrollment Levels,  1960 and 1983 
Secondary  school  Higher  education 
(percent of  (percent of 
age  group)  age  group) 
Countuy  1960  1983  1960  1983 
Middle-income  countries 
Lower  10  40  3  12 
Upper  20  55  4  14 
Industrial  countries  64  85  16  37 
Korea  27  89  5  24 
Source:  World Bank,  World Develop,nenit Report,  1983 and 1986 (World Bank,  1983 and 1986). 
Until recently, labor unrest and union activity have not been major 
issues in Korea. Cultural  characteristics  may contribute to peaceful 
labor  relations,  and politics, certainly,  has left little room  for organized 
labor  and  even less for union  militancy.  But government  policy has also 
helped bring  about a relative equality in income distribution  that may 
have helped  avoid labor  problems. 
Improvements  in Korean income distribution  since 1965, shown in 
table 8, are the result of strong growth in employment, and hence 
declining  unemployment.  Exactly how income distribution  has influ- 
enced growth, other than by promoting social stability, is  open to 
discussion.  But it would certainly  shape  the domestic  market  firms  face, 
it may influence  saving  behavior,  must  influence  politics, and may have 
important  implications  for the ease with which  the government  can shift 
economic  policies. 
Rapid  economic growth is often accompanied  by a deterioration  in 
Table  8. Income  Distribution,  Korea,  Various  Years, 1965-85 
Percent 
Item  1965  1970  1980  1985 
Rural  households 
Income share  of bottom  40 percent  22.6  21.2  17.5  19.7 
Income share  of top 20 percent  38.0  38.6  42.2  38.7 
Percent  below poverty linea  10.0  3.4  11.2  7.5 
Urban  households 
Income share  of bottom  40 percent  14.1  18.9  15.3  16.7 
Income share  of top 20 percent  47.0  43.0  46.9  45.6 
Percent  below poverty  linea  17.9  7.0  15.1  7.8 
Source:  Korea Development  Institute. 
a.  Poverty line defined as one-third of average household  income. 400  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 9.  Income Distribution Comparison 
Percent 
Hong 
Population  Koreaa  Brazilb  Mexicoc  Thailandd  Konge  Hungary'  Spaing 
Income share 
of bottom 
40 percent  16.9  7.0  9.9  15.2  16.2  20.5  19.4 
Income share 
of top 
20 percent  45.3  66.6  57.7  49.8  47.0  35.8  40.0 
Source:  World Bank,  World Developmenit Report,  1986. 
a.  1976.  b.  1972.  c.  1977.  d.  1975-76.  e.  1980.  f.  1982.  g.  1980-81. 
income  distribution  due  to shortages  of skilled  and  educated  labor.  Korea 
experienced these  shortages to  some extent in the  1970s, but the 
expansion  of education  since the 1950s  may  have helped  contain  adverse 
consequences  for growth. 
Income distribution  in Korea is similar  to that in other East Asian 
NICs and  in developed  countries.  It is extraordinarily  different  from  that 
in Latin  America,  as table  9 shows. 
A final  dimension  that  is much  harder  to quantify  is entrepreneurship. 
Korea  has rapidly  built  up large, Japanese-style  production  and trading 
conglomerates. But Korean growth and export success also has de- 
pended on massive gambles, especially in the late 1970s.  The outward- 
looking strategy  would not have succeeded without Korea's dynamic 
and highly trained  entrepreneurs,  yet another  legacy of Korea's com- 
mitment  to education.8 
The punch line in this discussion of the labor  force appears  in table 
10. As that comparison  of hourly  compensation  in major  industrialized 
countries  and in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore  shows, Korea's dollar 
wage is the lowest of all. The data in that table must be somewhat 
qualified,  however, because wages differ  significantly  from  one industry 
to  another. In some export-sector industries, wages in  1986 were 
significantly  higher  than  those shown  in the table  and  much  closer to the 
corresponding  wages in Taiwan. For example, in 1986  in the iron and 
steel sector the Korean  wage was $2.17, as against  $2.29 in Taiwan;  in 
motor  vehicles and  equipment  manufactures  the Korean  wage  was $2.12, 
compared  with $2.21  for Taiwan.  Thus  in the traded  goods sector, wages 
8.  See Noel  F. McGinn and others, Education  and Development  in Korea (Harvard 
University  Press, 1980). Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yang Chul Park  401 
Table 10.  Hourly Compensation in Manufacturing,  1986-87 
U.S. dollars  per hour 
Country  1986  1987a 
United States  13.21  13.21 
Germany  13.35  15.92 
Japan  9.47  11.03 
United Kingdom  7.50  8.32 
Korea  1.39  1.52 
Taiwan  1.66  2.02 
Singapore  2.23  2.29 
Hong Kong  1.88  1.88 
Source:  U.S.  Department of Labor,  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  and authors' calculations. 
a.  The  1987 data represent  1986 levels  of hourly compensation  evaluated  at June 1987 exchange  rates. 
among  Asian competitors  are much closer than indicated  by the manu- 
facturing  average, which, for Korea, even more  than  for the more open 
Asian economies, includes a share of lower-skilled  labor in the home 
goods sector.9 Still, the wage level is strikingly  low by international 
standards. 
THE  DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGY 
Government  policy support  for Korea's growth  goes beyond educa- 
tion  and  wage  restraint.  In  particular,  government  policies  have  sustained 
relative financial  stability  by never allowing massive, money-financed 
deficits and by following a real exchange rate policy that sustained 
profitability  of the traded goods sector rather than, Argentinian-  or 
Mexican-style,  inviting  capital  flight.  Beyond that, the government  used 
subsidies and preferential  credit allocation to channel capital to the 
traded  goods sector. The strategy  was clearly  activist, but  it avoided  the 
pitfalls of protection so apparent  in some Latin American countries 
where  import  substitution  often came at the price of exports and hence 
led sooner  or later  to balance  of payments  crises. 
Korean growth in the past thirty years resembles that of postwar 
Germany,  especially  in the 1950s  and  early 1960s,  or of Japan.  An ample 
9. There  are no up-to-date  indexes for hourly  compensation  in Latin America.  The 
latest available  data  are for 1985.  At that time hourly  compensation  was $1.73  in Brazil, 
$2.66  in Mexico,  and  $2.07  in Venezuela,  as against  $1.44  in Korea.  For  Portugal  and  Spain 
the corresponding  1985  numbers  are $1.53  and $4.79. The data  are  from  the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor  Statistics. 402  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
supply  of labor,  first  from  agriculture  and subsequently  through  migrant 
workers, put steady pressure on wages, and policy, too, discouraged 
extravagant  wage settlements.  As a result, wages that  were low relative 
to productivity  translated  into profitability,  high investment, and sus- 
tained growth.  10  Low relative wages and high investment  assured pro- 
ductivity  growth  and  hence steady, high  growth  of real  wages, as shown 
for Germany and Japan in table 11.11 
Despite the broad similarities  in the wage-productivity  relationship 
of Germany  and Japan,  policies in the two countries  were not quite the 
same. Both successfully  pursued  wage restraint,  a "realistic"  exchange 
rate policy, and, as we will see below, a current  account surplus. But 
Germany  relied more on import  liberalization,  both unilaterally  and in 
the context of the Common  Market, while Japan  never opened up in 
manufacturing.  Japan's growth lasted through  the 1960s and into the 
early 1970s.  In Germany,  real wage demands  and a strong  emphasis  on 
consumption  in the mid-  1960s  marked  the end of the high-growth  phase. 
Today Korea stands roughly in the same position relative to the 
United States in which Japan  stood in 1960. The standard  of living is 
one-third  that  of the United  States, and  the level of hourly  compensation 
is about  one-tenth.  Like Japan  in the 1950s  and 1960s,  South  East Asia, 
and Korea in particular,  practices  wage restraint,  high saving, and high 
investment.  The  strategy  delivers  highgrowthrates  of realwages  because 
productivity  growth  invariably  runs slightly  ahead  of wage increases at 
the competitive  margin. 
We consider next how exchange rate policy and subsidy and credit 
policies helped  reinforce  this growth  strategy. 
Outward-Oriented  Growth. Japan  has developed with a nearly con- 
stant ratio of exports to GNP. In Korea, by contrast, the export-GNP 
ratio increased  from less than 6 percent in the early 1960s  to around  40 
percent in the 1980s. Korea's German-style  "outward-oriented"  strat- 
egy is the characteristic  of its development  most commonly  singled  out 
as the key to success. Rather  than  pushing  inefficient  import  substitution 
for its small domestic market, Korea has opted for outward-oriented 
10. Herbert  Giersch,  "Arbeit,  Lohn  und  Produktivitat,"  Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv, 
vol. 119, no. 1 (1983),  pp. 1-18, has discussed extensively this paradigm  for the case of 
Germany. 
11. By comparison  the average  annual  growth  rate of unit labor  costs in the United 
States  during  1950-65  was 1.9  percent. Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yaing  Chul Park  403 
Table 11.  Growth in Manufacturing in Germany and Japan,  1950-65 
Percent per year 
Dollar  unit  Real 
Countiy  Productivity  Emnployment  labor cost  wagesa  Investmentb 
Germany  7.0  3.3  2.8  7.2  22.8 
Japan  7.2  5.7  1.4  5.7  26.8 
Source:  U.S.  Department of Labor,  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  Hourly compensation  deflated by the CPI. 
b.  Gross fixed capital formation as a fraction of GNP; Japan,  1952-64,  Germany,  1950-64. 
growth.  Except in 1979-81,  government  policy has avoided  an overval- 
ued exchange  rate. By standing  in the way of a strong  union  movement, 
the government  sanctioned  the market  pressure  on wages generated  by 
the  rural-to-urban  labor  migration.  Wages  thus  rose slowly  despite  strong 
productivity growth in manufacturing.  Growth in employment and 
continuing  profitability  of the export sector rather than much faster 
growth in manufacturing  real wages were the result. Industrial  policy 
and  protection  combined  to yield an incentive structure  that  favored  an 
export-oriented  industrialization. 
Korea's policies clearly do not represent a laissez-faire approach: 
intervention in the form of trade restrictions, subsidies, and credit 
allocation is  pervasive.12 Intervention has also been used in Latin 
America,  but with mixed  results. In the 1930s  Latin  America  developed 
import  substitution  as a response to the Great Depression. As Angus 
Maddison documents, the import-substitution  strategy was initially 
successful: Latin America grew, whereas industrial countries stag- 
nated.13  But  following  World  War  II further  import  substitution  ran  into 
12.  See  Anne 0.  Krueger,  The Developmental  Role  of the Foreign  Sector  and Aid 
(Harvard  University Press, 1979);  Krueger, "Export-led  Industrial  Growth  Reconsid- 
ered," in Wontack  Hong and Lawrence B. Krause, eds.,  Trade  and Growth  of the 
AdvancedDeveloping  Countries in the Pacific Basin (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 
1981), pp. 3-27; Krueger, Trade and Employment in Developing  Countries: Synthesis and 
Conclusions  (University  of Chicago  Press, 1983);  Krueger,  "The  Importance  of Economic 
Policy  in Development";  Deepak  Lal, "Ideology  and Industrialization  in India  and East 
Asia," Report  DRD218  (World  Bank,  January  1986);  Deepak  Lal  and  Sarath  Rajapatirama, 
"Foreign  Trade  Regimes  and  Economic  Growth  in Developing  Countries,"  Report  DRD 
217 (World  Bank, September  1986);  and Wontack  Hong, "Export-Oriented  Growth  in 
Korea,"  for discussions  of the outward-oriented  model  as applied  in Korea. 
13.  See Angus Maddison, Two Crises: Latin America and Asia: 1929-1938 and 1973- 
1983  (Paris:  Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and  Development,  1985). 404  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
the  limitations  of overly small  domestic  markets.  Moreover,  increasingly 
pervasive import protection soon became an impediment  to exports. 
Slow growth,  overvalued  exchange  rates, and  inefficient  industries  were 
the legacy of that policy everywhere  except Brazil. Perhaps  because of 
its larger  domestic market,  Brazil successfully used protection  to build 
up a highly  efficient  industrial  structure.  Brazil  also, unlike  other Latin 
American  countries, avoided the external bottlenecks that arise from 
implicit taxes on exports. Exchange rate and tax policies strongly 
supported  exports  and  thus  avoided  recurrent  payments  crises with  their 
adverse  macroeconomic  effects on confidence,  inflation,  and  recession. 
The Korean strategy  is much  the same, with pervasive protection  of 
an infant-industry  kind going hand in hand  with favorable  treatment  of 
the export sector through  tax incentives and credit. The economy thus 
maintains  a constant  active contact  with the world  economy on both the 
import  and  export side. Korea  goes further  in its outward  orientation  by 
allowing firms to take advantage of intermediate  goods imports to 
enhance  their  export  competitiveness. 
Such an outward-oriented  strategy is supported by the efficiency 
advantage  of freer trade  over a restrictive  trade  regime. Export  promo- 
tion is more closely related  to free trade  than is import  substitution.  In 
addition,  the effects of enlarged  trade  on saving  and investment,  and on 
technology  and  firms'  behavior,  and the possibility  of structural  change 
coming  from  opening  industries  to world  markets  all add  to the argument 
for export promotion.14  However, while the high positive correlation 
between export performance  and economic growth is an accepted fact 
in development  economics, recent studies  fail to confirm  that  the former 
causes the latter.  15 
14. See W. M. Corden,  "The Effects of Trade  on the Rate of Growth,"  in Jagdish  N. 
Bhagwati  and others,  eds.,  Trade,  the Balance  of  Payments  and  Growth: Papers  in 
International  Economics  in  Honor  of  Charles  P.  Kindleberger  (Amsterdam:  North- 
Holland,  1971),  pp. 117-43;  Krueger,  "Export-led  Industrial  Growth  Reconsidered";  and 
Hong, "  Export-Oriented  Growth  of Korea." 
15. Bela Balassa, "Exports  and Economic  Growth:  Further  Evidence," Journal  of 
Development  Economics,  vol. 5 (June  1978),  pp. 181-89;  Corden,  "The Effects of Trade 
on the Rate  of Growth";  A. F. Darrat,  "Are  Exports  an Engine  of Growth?  Another  Look 
at the Evidence,"  Applied  Economics,  vol. 19  (February  1987),  pp. 277-83;  Hong, Trade, 
Distortions  and Employmnent  Growth in Korea; Wontack Hong,  "Import Restriction and 
Import  Liberalization  in Export-Oriented  Developing  Economy" (Korea Development 
Institute,  1986);  Hong, "  Export-Oriented  Growth  and  Trade  Patterns  of Korea," in Colin Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  405 
The  chief  difference  between  the Korean  strategy  of outward-oriented 
growth  and the failed import-substitution  policies in Latin America in 
the 1950s  is that in Latin America  protection  was too comprehensive, 
and  too little attention  was paid  to the possibility  of exporting  manufac- 
tures  to complement  import  substitution.  The policy became inefficient 
in  part  because  high  value  added  sectors  (at  world  prices)  were sacrificed, 
but perhaps  even more because the export sector atrophied.  The Latin 
economies were therefore  more crisis prone, and their  macroeconomic 
performance  worsened. 
In Korea, an industrialization  strategy that began as pure import 
substitution,  with  aid  financing  the trade  gap, expanded  to include  export 
promotion.  By around  1960,  Korea  had  virtually  exhausted  the possibil- 
ity of rapid  growth  through  import  substitution  of nondurable  consumer 
goods and intermediate  inputs. Additional  import substitution  of ma- 
chinery,  consumer  durables,  and their  intermediate  inputs  was rejected 
because  the domestic  market  was too small  and  the capital  requirements 
of such ventures too large, especially given the chronic shortage of 
foreign  exchanges. 
The rationale  for protecting  infant  industries  is that  industries  of high 
growth potential but subject to  externality stemming from market 
imperfection,  economies  of scale, or  capital  market  imperfection  deserve 
encouragement,  preferably  by production  subsidies but, second best, 
by protection.  That  argument  provides  the underlying  logic as much  for 
import  substitution  as for export  promotion.  Korea  has operated  on both 
fronts. It has used tariffs  and licensing  to create a sheltered  market  for 
the development  of infants. And as these industries  have developed, 
Korea has turned  them toward the world market  by subsidies, credit, 
and exchange rate policy. The credit system has channeled financial 
resources  at subsidized  rates  to preferred  activities. The tax system has 
provided an exemption from import duties for export content (often 
I. Bradford and William H. Branson, eds.,  Trade and Structural Change in Pacific Asia 
(University  of Chicago  Press, 1986),  pp. 273-305;  Woo S. Jung  and Peyton J. Marshall, 
"Exports, Growth  and Causality  in Developing Countries,"  Journal of Development 
Economics,  vol. 18  (May-June  1985),  pp. 1-12;  Rostam  M. Kavoussi,  "Export  Expansion 
and  Economic  Growth:  Further  Empirical  Evidence,"  Journal  of Development  Econom- 
ics, vol. 14  (January-February  1984),  pp.  241-50;  Michael  Michaely,  "Exports  and  Growth: 
An Empirical Investigation,"  Journal of Development  Economics,  vol.  4 (March 1977), 
pp. 49-53. 406  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
amounting  to much  more  than  a drawback),  favorable  tax rates  on profits 
and incomes, and direct cash subsidies. The implicit  subsidy, from all 
sources, per dollar  export is shown in table 12. The table separates  net 
export subsidies  and gross; the latter  include  exemptions  from indirect 
taxes and  tariffs. 
The  combined  effect of the tax system  and  the credit  system  is difficult 
to estimate, in part  because various  activities  even within  a given sector 
are treated  differently.  In a system with  preferential  credit  allocation,  at 
least as important  as the rate  of interest  is where  the credit  goes. Because 
the export sector receives a major  share  of available  official  credit, the 
subsidy  data  in table 12  are surely  underestimated. 
As an economy becomes more industrialized  and more advanced, 
conflicts between import substitution  and an active export sector in- 
crease. Exporters  often require  access to lower-cost or higher-quality 
inputs of intermediate  goods than the home market  can yet deliver. In 
that  situation,  protection  must  be flexible.  Korea  moved  in  that  direction 
in the early 1980s  when it opened its markets  to certain  imports  crucial 
to the export  sector, while continuing  to protect  infant  industries. 
Exchange  Rate Policy. A policy of export-led  growth  would in most 
circumstances include a wage in dollars that, in combination with 
technology, capacity, and productivity,  would make a country highly 
competitive. At first sight it might  appear  that wage and exchange rate 
policies in Korea  did not in fact combine  to produce  this result. Figure  2 
shows Korean  unit labor  costs in dollars  relative  to an average  of U.S. 
and  Japanese  dollar  unit  labor  costs. The index nearly  doubled  between 
1973  and 1979, and the real depreciation  of the won in the early 1980s 
rolled back only a small part of the increase. The sharp increase in 
Korean relative unit labor costs during 1973-79 might suggest that 
competitiveness  must  have suffered,  but  the trade  performance  indicates 
no such thing. 
The  explanation  is that  Korean  hourly  compensation  in  manufacturing 
remains even today extraordinarily  low by comparison with that in 
industrialized  countries.  In a considerable  range  of activities, productiv- 
ity differentials  may now be negligible. The existing wage differential 
thus represents  an open invitation  for industrial  expansion and export 
expansion.  As new industries  open  up, implementing  foreign  technology 
and  drawing  on the world  capital  market  for  financial  resources  to finance 
capital expansion, a rise in the average relative unit labor cost  is Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  407 
Table 12.  Export Subsidies, Korea,  1961-80 
Percentage  subsidy per dollar  foreign  exchange 
Subsidy  1961-69  1970-79  1980 
Gross  25.3  22.2  21.3 
Net  12.8  3.3  3.3 
Sources:  Larry E.  Westphal  and  Kwang-Suk  Kim,  "Korea,"  in Bela  Balassa,  ed.,  Development  Strategies  in 
Semi-Induistrial Economies  (Washington,  D.C.:  World  Bank,  1982),  pp.  212-79;  C.  H.  Nam,  "Trade,  Industrial 
Policies  and the  Structure of  Protection  in Korea,"  in Wontack  Hong  and Lawrence  B.  Krause,  eds.,  Trade and 
Growth of the Advanced  Developing  Countries in the Pacific Basin  (Seoul:  Korea Development  Institute,  1981), pp. 
168-89; and Kwang-Suk  Kim,  "The Timing and Sequencing  of a Trade Liberalization  Policy-The  Case of Korea" 
(Seoul:  Korea Development  Institute,  1986). 
warranted.  Policy has pushed industries  into ranges  of increasing  value 
added  rather  than  pulling  labor  out of such industries  as, say, textiles or 
rubber  footwear.  Thus  if labor  is being  reallocated  toward  production  of 
cars and electronics, away from low value added activities, export 
competitiveness  survives  even with rising  unit  labor  costs. 
This point can be developed in terms  of a Ricardian  model of export 
of technology, as shown in figure  3.16  The model determines  for a two- 
country  world  the equilibrium  relative  wage and the geographic  pattern 
of specialization.  Let w/w*  be the wage of the poor country  relative to 
the rich one and let A(z)  =  a*(z)la(z)  represent the relative unit labor 
requirement  of commodity  z in the rich country relative to that in the 
poor country. Along the vertical axis we measure the relative wage 
w/w* and the  relative  unit labor requirements,  a*(z)la(z).  Along  the 
horizontal  axis we align the range of goods, z, with the poor country 
relatively more efficient in the production  of commodities nearer the 
origin. 
Geographic  specialization  is determined  by relative  unit labor  costs. 
The  home  country  will produce  all those goods for which  unit  labor  costs 
are  less than  the unit  labor  cost of the same  good produced  abroad.  Thus 
for a particular  good z, production  will be at home if wa(z) <  w*a*(z). 
16. R. Dornbusch,  S. Fischer,  and  P. A. Samuelson,  "Comparative  Advantage,  Trade, 
and  Payments  in a Ricardian  Model with a Continuum  of Goods," American  Economic 
Review, vol. 67 (December  1977),  pp. 823-39; Paul Krugman,  "A Model  of Innovation, 
Technology  Transfer  and  the World  Distribution  of Income," Journal  of Political Econ- 
omy, vol. 87 (April  1979),  pp. 253-66; Krugman,  "Technology  Gaps,  Technology  Trans- 
fers, and  the Changing  Character  of U.S. Trade"  (MIT, 1982);  Krugman,  "A Technology 
Gap Model of International  Trade" (MIT, 1982);  and Susan M. Collins, "Technical 
Progress  in a Three-Country  Ricardian  Model with a Continuum  of Goods," Journal  of 
International Economics,  vol.  19 (August 1985), pp. 170-79. 408  Br-ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Figure 2.  Relative Unit Labor Costs, Korea, 1964-86a 








1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
Source:  U.S.  Department of Labor,  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  Korean manufactturing  unit labor costs  in dollars relative to an average of  U.S.  and Japanese unit labor costs. 
For a given relative  wage, w/w*,  we thus obtain  the competitive  margin 
between production at home and abroad. But the relative wage is 
endogenous  and  is determined  by demand  and  relative  levels of spending. 
Demand  conditions  are shown  by the schedule  OB, along  which  demand 
for domestically  produced  goods is equal  to the full-employment  supply. 
An increase  in the range  of goods produced  by the home  country  (moving 
along  the horizontal  axis to the right)  creates an excess demand  for labor 
and hence leads to an increase  in the equilibrium  relative  wage. Point  E 
represents the general equilibrium  where goods markets clear and 
production  occurs in the lowest-cost location. The home country pro- 
duces goods in the range Ozo, and the foreign country, the range of 
products  to the right  of zo. 
We now use this framework  to ask what happens to relative wages 
and to trade  patterns  when superior  foreign  technology  is introduced  in 
the poor country. At point H in figure 4,  w/w* =  1; at the initial 
equilibrium  at point E, wlw* <  1, and the foreign country  has superior 
technology  for goods that  the poor  country  is already  producing.  As this Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  409 
Figure 3.  The Ricardian Model 
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technology  is imported,  the poor country's relative unit labor require- 
ment declines and the A(z) schedule rotates upward. The improved 
technology reduces labor costs in the export industry  and allows the 
poor  country  to expand  the range  of goods it can competitively  produce. 
But the attempt  to expand  the export  sector  inevitably  creates  an excess 
demand  for labor  and hence leads to a rise in the relative  wage. A new 
trade  equilibrium  results  at point  E' with an increase  in the relative  wage 
from  xo  to x' and  an  expansion  from  zo  to z' in the range  of goods produced 
in the poor  country. 
Now consider what the import  of superior  technology does to unit 
labor costs. For marginal  industries  the relative unit labor cost of the 
poor country  declines. This is true, for example, near  point  E'. But it is 
not necessarily  true  for the average. For activities to the left of point H 
there  is no change  in technology  and  a rise in the average relative  wage. 410  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2.]1987 
Hence it is quite  possible in this model that a country  shows a rise in its 
relative unit labor cost and yet shows a gain in competitiveness and 
hence an expansion  in the range  of goods produced.  17 
Indeed, the larger  the gain in relative  unit labor  costs, the larger  the 
loss to the rich  country  from  its export  of technology. The reason  is that 
traditional  export  industries  that  have not benefited  from  the transfer  of 
technology now pay higher  wages. As Korea, for example, moves into 
cars and computers as a result of productivity  gains, other tradable 
sectors experience  increased  costs and  hence charge  higher  prices. In a 
multicountry  context Korea is a middle-income  country, whose gain in 
productivity  has spillover  effects on poorer  countries  who now gain in 
competitiveness  in the middle-income  country's traditional  export sec- 
tors. 18 
There  are several  other  ways in which  a NIC can become more  export 
competitive and yet show a rise in the relative unit labor cost. Each 
complements  the technology-transfer  explanation.  One obvious possi- 
bility is reduced-cost  access to imported  intermediate  goods. Here the 
tax incentives and  credit  subsidies  already  discussed clearly  play a role. 
Another possibility is to become a supplier of intermediate  goods in 
more advanced countries. The final possibility is to move in Japan's 
tracks, picking  up industries  that  in Japan  have become overly costly. 
The explanations  drawn  from  Ricardian  trade  theory  are particularly 
suitable for Korea because they highlight  productivity  growth, which 
has played such a central  role in Korea's growing  export competitive- 
ness. But to what extent are these results  the outcome of market  forces 
and to what extent do they depend on policies? Since the early 1970s 
Korea has experienced both a rising share of exports in GDP and an 
increasing share in world manufactures  exports. From 1973 to  1985 
Korea's manufactures  exports increased  in volume terms at an annual 
average  rate  of 14.6  percent,  while its share  in the manufactures  exports 
of developing countries rose from 11 percent to 18.5 percent.19  Wage 
and exchange rate policy did not stand in the way of these market 
17. When  there  is a nontraded  manufacturing  sector  without  productivity  growth,  the 
presumption  that  the average  relative  unit  labor  cost rises is further  strengthened. 
18. See Collins, "Technical  Progress,"  for a model that develops these effects in a 
three-country  setting. 
19. See United  Nations,  General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade,  International  Trade 
1985-86  (GATT,  1986),  p. 16. Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  411 
Figure 4.  Importing Superior Technology 
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developments  in the manner  that  happens  frequently  in Latin  America: 
by discouraging  union activity and strikes, the government  promoted 
employment  growth  and investment  in the export sector rather  than a 
still faster growth  in real wages. And by avoiding overvaluation,  unit 
labor  costs in dollars  were kept from  rising  faster than  a broad  range  of 
new and  arising  industries  could afford. 
SAVING,  INVESTMENT,  AND  FINANCIAL  POLICY 
For Korea  to take advantage  of its export  opportunities,  it needed an 
expanded  manufacturing  base. For that, it needed high rates of invest- 
ment. Figure  5 shows the growth  of investment  as a ratio  of GNP since 
1970.  Table 13, which shows the financing  of investment  by domestic 
and foreign saving, makes clear that Korea amply used external re- 412  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Figure 5.  Investment to GNP Ratio, Korea, 1970-86a 
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a.  Gross  fixed capital formation in the national income  accounts. 
sources. Until 1986  the current  account was continuously  in deficit. In 
some years the deficit  reached  more  than 10  percent  of GNP. But unlike 
Mexico or Argentina,  Korea  used external  finance  for investment  rather 
than  for consumption  or capital  flight. 
High  rates of investment  are not sufficient  for success. If investment 
is misallocated so that it has a low social rate of return, then a high 
investment  rate  can  ultimately  (by  way of debt  service  problems)  become 
a difficulty  rather  than  a source  of growth.  There  seems to be widespread 
agreement  that the heavy and chemical industry  investment  campaign 
of the 1970s  involved  a misallocation  of resources.20  We know  today  that 
world excess  capacity in these industries made investment in them 
dubious. But there is no hard  evidence that Korea's investments  were 
in fact poor. The  judgment  that  the investment  drive  was a poor  idea  was 
made in 1980-82, when excess capacity was large and the second oil 
20.  See  World Bank,  Korea:  Development  in a  Global  Context; and World Bank, 
Korea: Managing  the Industrial Transition. Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  413 
Table 13.  Korean Saving and Investment, 1960-86 
Percent of GNP 
Gross  National  saving 
domestic  Foreign 
Period  investment  Total  Business  Personal  savinga 
1960-69  18.2  8.9  b  b  9.1 
1970-79  27.6  20.5  8.5c  10.5c  6.8 
1979  36.0  26.5  8.8  11.2  8.9 
1980  32.1  20.8  8.8  6.6  11.5 
1981  30.3  20.5  8.2  6.7  9.8 
1982  28.6  20.9  8.0  6.8  7.0 
1983  29.9  25.3  10.5  7.6  4.7 
1984  31.9  27.9  11.0  9.9  4.0 
1985  31.1  28.6  11.1  10.6  3.1 
1986  30.2  32.8  n.a.  n.a.  -  2.8 
Source:  EPB,  Major Statistics  of Korean Economy,  various issues. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Equals  gross  domestic  investment  minus  total  national  saving.  The  identity  may  not  be  exact  because  the 
statistical discrepancy  is omitted. 
b.  Average  private saving for 1960-69  was 7.4 percent of GNP. 
c.  Average for 1975-79. 
shock hurt  the chemical  industry  in particular.  Today it is apparent  that 
many of these industries  have gained in export share. The automobile 
industry  is a case in point. In any event, the investment  portfolio  was 
sufficiently  well chosen that  real  wages increased  and  exports  expanded 
enough  to pay interest  and  even principal  on the external  resources  that 
helped  finance  the investment. 
Improved  technology has come with high investment levels. Tech- 
nological  development  naturally  begins  with  the importation  of advanced 
foreign  technology,  and  proceeds through  the development  of domestic 
variants  of this imported  technology, and eventually to technological 
self-reliance. As  successive  five-year economic development plans 
unfolded, Korea came to recognize that technology was an essential 
ingredient  in enabling  industry  to produce for the world market. The 
government  thus made  a major  effort  to digest, adopt, and  adapt  foreign 
technology.21  One of the pillars of Korea's science and technology 
21. See Larry  E. Westphal  and Kwang  Suk Kim, "Korean  Industrial  Competence: 
Where It Came From," in Bela Balassa,  ed., Development  Strategies  in Semi-Industrial- 
ized Economies  (Johns  Hopkins University  Press, 1982),  pp. 212-79; and H. S. Choi, 
"Science  and  Technology  Policies  for Industrial  Development,"  in Industrialization  and 
Development  Strategies  (Korea  Development  Institute,  1986). 414  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
development  policy  was  refining  the  ability  to identify  appropriate  foreign 
technology, properly  select, and  then adapt  it. 
The Budget and Financial Stability. The chief contrast between 
Korea and Latin America  lies no doubt in the budget and in financial 
markets. In Korea budget and financial  market policies helped keep 
inflation  in check and avoided capital flight during  the early 1980s, a 
period  of high  inflation  and  large  budget  deficits  worldwide.  Despite the 
oil and  commodity  supply  shocks of the late 1970s  and  the real  deprecia- 
tion of 1979,  inflation  never quite reached  30 percent-certainly not an 
extreme level, again  by Latin American  standards.  The unified  budget 
deficit, although  swinging  widely, never reached  5 percent of GNP and 
never stayed  very high  for more  than  two years in a row. Figure  6 shows 
the behavior of the deficit from 1970 to 1986, and figure 7 shows the 
steady  postwar  expansion  in taxation-that  is one source  of Korea's  fiscal 
stability. 
Because of that stability, Korea has suffered no major  buildup of 
domestic debt. Nor has the budget deficit at any point become large 
enough  to necessitate  rapid  money creation.  This latter  point is brought 
out by a simple  model  of money-financed  budget  deficits.22  Suppose  that 
the budget deficit is a fraction g of real output and that it is entirely 
financed  by base money creation. Suppose  further  that the base money 
velocity is a linear  function  of the rate  of inflation.  Under  these assump- 
tions  we can derive  a simple  relation  between  the deficit  ratio,  the growth 
rate  of money, and  the rate  of inflation:23 
(1)  F  =  g  (a  +  ow), 
where Vj  is the growth rate of money, cx  is a constant in the velocity 
equation,  and 0 represents  the responsiveness  of velocity to the rate of 
inflation,  wT.  Next we use the steady-state  relationship  between  inflation, 
money growth,  and  the growth  rate  of real  income: 
(2)  s  = >  -  ay, 
22.  This model follows  Robert A. Mundell, Monetary Theory: Inflation, Interest and 
Growth  in the World  Economy  (Pacific  Palisades,  California:  Goodyear  Publishing  Com- 
pany, 1971). 
23. Deficit  finance  implies  that  MIP = g Y,  where  M is the nominal  money  expansion 
and Ythe  level  of output.  This  can  be rewritten  as pL(M/P)  = g Yor  p.  = g Y/(M/P). Assuming 
monetary  equilibrium  and using the velocity equation Y/(M/P) =  a  +  OI, we obtain 
equation  1  in the text. Rudieer Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  415 
Figure 6.  Unified Budget Deficit, Korea, 1970-86 
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Source:  Bank of Korea,  Economic  Planning Board, Major Statistics  of Korean  Economy,  various  issues. 
where a is the income elasticity of money demand  and y is the growth 
rate of real income. Combining  these two relations  yields an equation 
for the rate  of inflation: 
(3)  IT =  (ag  -  cy)/(1  -  Og). 
Three points emerge from this simple equation. First, the budget 
deficit influences the inflation  rate in a highly nonlinear  fashion. The 
added  inflation  from an extra 1 percent deficit is greater  the higher  the 
deficit.  Second, the higher  the growth  rate  of real  output,  and  the higher 
the income elasticity of money demand,  the lower the rate of inflation. 
Third,  the intercept  of the velocity equation, a, influences  the inflation 
impact  of a given  deficit.  Other  things  equal,  the  availability  of substitutes 
for domestic money, such as dollar deposits, a possibility of external 
asset holdings,  or financial  liberalization  that  reduces  bank  deposits and 
hence reserves, tends to raise velocity and  hence the inflation  impact  of 
a given deficit  ratio. 
Each  of these points is relevant  to a comparison  between the Korean 
and Latin American economies. In Korea the deficit never reached 416  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Figure 7.  Taxes as a Percentage of GNP, Korea, 1953-86 
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exceptionally high levels and certainly  not for long. Growth  has been 
high  and financial  liberalization,  until  recently, moderate.  Dollarization 
never occurred. As a result the inflation rate never reached Latin 
American  ranges, and  because it did not, pressure  for financial  liberali- 
zation  (which  in turn  increases  inflation  unless there  is deficit  correction) 
was never strong. 
The revenue from base money creation, or seignorage, is well ex- 
plained  in Korea  by two determinants:  inflation  and  growth.  To explore 
this relation  we ran a regression  of the ratio of base money creation  to 
nominal  GDP on inflation  and growth.  The results, using ordinary  least 
squares  with annual  data  for the period 1970-86, were as follows: 
Seignorage=  -1.38  +  0.23  Growth +  0.065 Inflation, 
GDP  (-1.75)  (3.87)  (2.16) 
R2  = 0.45; Durbin-Watson  =  2.0, 
with t-statistics  in parentheses.  Over the sample  period  on average  the 
government  derived 1.35 percent of GDP in revenue from base money 
creation.  During  the 1970s  the revenue  reached  2.2 percent  of GDP and Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chuil  Park  417 
thus financed the major part of the budget deficit. If seignorage is 
considered  just another  tax, the government  financed  the major  part  of 
outlays in one form or another  by taxation rather  than by borrowing. 
The rising share of outright  taxes in GDP in the 1970s  reduced budget 
deficits  and  made  it possible to shift  to lower rates of inflation. 
Together  with the shift  to lower inflation  the government  also started 
financing  deficits increasingly  by domestic debt rather  than by money 
creation.  The domestic  public  debt ratio, which ranged  between 3 and  4 
percent  of GDP in the 1970s,  has started  rising  moderately,  although  it 
is still far below 10  percent  of GDP. With  levels of real interest  rates in 
excess of 10  percent  a year, a larger  debt  burden  would  easily become a 
problem  by itself, as has been the case in Brazil  or in Mexico. In Korea 
the small  size of the debt makes  this issue unimportant. 
Just as Korea's domestic debt was small, so was its external  public 
sector  debt (not, though,  publicly  guaranteed  debt).24  As a consequence 
the world  interest  rate  shocks of the early 1980s  and  the real  depreciation 
did not have a direct impact on the budget via the debt channel. By 
contrast,  Latin  America,  where  much  if not most of the debt  was directly 
in the public sector, suffered a major budget deterioration, sharply 
increased  deficit  finance,  and inflation. 
Financial Repression. Financial repression helped finance budget 
deficits in a relatively noninflationary  way, as already mentioned, by 
keeping money substitutes out of reach. But it supported financial 
stability  and growth  in other important  ways.25  With  Korea's domestic 
financial  market  underdeveloped  and market information  not readily 
available, the Korean government stepped in, exerting far-reaching 
influence  through  ownership  of financial  intermediaries  and control of 
access to foreign  capital. 
By controlling  capital  outflows and thus forestalling  capital  flight  in 
moments  of economic and political uncertainty,  such as 1980-81, the 
24.  By the IMF definition (line 89a.h of International Financial Statistics),  the external 
public  debt  in 1985  had  reached  9.7 percent  of GDP. Total  Korean  external  debt amounts 
to more  than  40 percent  of GDP. 
25. See especially David C. Cole and Yung Chul Park, Financial Development  in 
Korea, 1945-1978  (Harvard  University  Press, 1983);  Park, "Financial  Repression,  Lib- 
eralization,  and  Development  in Developing  Countries"  (Korea  University,  1985);  and  Y. 
J. Cho and David Cole, "The Role of the Financial Sector in Korea's Structural 
Adjustment"  (Korea  Development  Institute,  1986). 418  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
government  has avoided  the extra  real  depreciation  required  to generate 
the foreign  exchange  that  finances  capital  flight.  Avoiding  real  deprecia- 
tion  is tantamount  to avoiding  major  inflationary  shocks, a lesson learned 
painfully in Mexico and Argentina,  where capital flight forced major 
exchange  depreciation. 
The government's  financial  repression  has also mobilized  resources 
for investment  in targeted  areas. By paying  depositors  low real interest 
rates  and  by controlling  capital  outflows,  the  government  implicitly  taxed 
depositors, then channeled  the proceeds to favored sectors for invest- 
ment.  Although  Korea  is often  cited  as an  example  of successful  financial 
liberalization  with high  and positive real interest  rates mobilizing  finan- 
cial resources  for investment  and growth,  table 14 shows that real rates 
have not been high, except in 1965-69, in the immediate  aftermath  of 
financial  reform  .26 Moreover,  even lapses  into  small  negative  real  interest 
rates did not interfere  with a steady increase  in the ratio  of M3 to GDP, 
as shown in figure  8. 
The  relationship  between  saving  and  interest  rates  remains  unresolved 
in Korea,  just as everywhere  else. Some authors  have argued  that high 
real interest  rates caused the saving spurt  and that the financial  reform 
in 1965  spurred  the expansion  in intermediation  in the latter  half of the 
1960s.27  Others, however, show that Korea's saving responds little to 
interest  rates.28  Overall,  the Korean  experience  suggests  that  there  is no 
need for high positive real interest  rates to mobilize saving through  the 
26. See A. Lanyi  and  R. Saracoglu,  "Interest  Rate  Policies  in Developing  Countries," 
Occasional Paper 22 (International  Monetary Fund, October 1983); Vicente Galbis, 
"Financial  Intermediation  and  Economic  Growth  in Less-Developed  Countries:  A Theo- 
retical Approach,"  Journal of Development  Studies,  vol.  13 (January 1977), pp. 58-72; 
Ronald  McKinnon,  "Financial  Repression  and the Liberalisation  Problem  within  Less 
Developed  Countries,"  in Sven Grassman  and  Erik  Lundberg,  eds., The  WorldEconomic 
Order:  Past and Prospects (St. Martin's  Press, 1982);  Ronald  McKinnon  and Donald  J. 
Mathieson,  "How To Manage  a Repressed  Economy,"  Princeton  Essays in International 
Finance, 145 (Princeton University, 1981); and Mathieson, "Financial Reform and 
Stabilization  Policy  in a Developing  Economy,  " Journal ofDevelopment  Economics,  vol. 
7 (September  1980),  pp. 359-95. 
27. See John  Gurley,  Hugh  Patrick,  and Edward  Shaw, "The Financial  Structure  in 
Korea" (Stanford  University, 1967);  and  Ronald  I. McKinnon,  ed., Money  and Finance 
in Economic  Growth and Development:  Essays  in Honor of Edward Shaw (New  York: 
Marcel  Dekker, 1976). 
28. See, for example, Alberto Giovannini,  "The Interest Elasticity of Savings in 
Developing  Countries:  The Existing  Evidence," World  Development,  vol. 11  (July  1983), Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  419 
Table 14.  Real Interest Rates, Korea,  1960-86 
Percent 
Export sector 
Period  Curb marketa  Depositsa  loansb 
1960-64  31.1  -  6.7  n.a. 
1965-69  44.4  26.9  n.a. 
1970-74  28.2  -0.2  -  16.3 
1975-79  24.0  -4.5  -  12.5 
1980  16.3  -2.4  -  10.3 
1981  14.0  3.8  -0.4 
1982  23.4  4.2  4.7 
1983  22.4  1.3  6.1 
1984  22.5  5.3  6.2 
1985  21.5  5.8  5.9 
1986  20.8  7.7  7.7 
Source:  EPB, Major Statistics  ofKorean  Econo,tny, various issues;  IMF, Governmienit  Statistics  Yearbook, various 
issues;  and  World  Bank,  Korea, vol. 22 (Washington,  D.C.: World  Bank, 1987). 
n.a. Not available. 
a. Nominal  interest  rate  less consumer  price  inflation. 
b. Nominal  interest  rate  less inflation  of the GNP deflator. 
financial  system;  as long as large  negative  real  interest  rates  are  avoided, 
the real  interest  rate is relatively  insignificant. 
FAVORABLE  WORLD  ECONOMIC  ENVIRONMENT 
The final  element in Korea's success was the world economic envi- 
ronment.  Korea's exposure to world economic influences  differs little 
from  that of Taiwan, Singapore,  or Hong Kong, all of which have the 
same trade structure, importing  oil and commodities and exporting 
manufactures.  But it differs significantly  from that of Latin American 
countries,  such  as Brazil  or  Argentina,  that  are  net  commodity  exporters. 
That  difference  became crucially  important  in the late 1970s  and early 
1980s,  because real oil prices moved up and commodity  prices moved 
down.  As a result,  Brazil  had  a much  larger  terms-of-trade  deterioration 
than did Korea. Opportunities  in the Middle East for construction 
projects,  of which Korea  took significant  advantage,  were an additional 
pp. 601-07;  S. van Wijnbergen,  "Macro-economic  Effects of Changes  in Bank Interest 
Rates:  Simulation  Results  for South  Korea,"  Journal  ofDevelopmnent  Economics,  vol. 18 
(August 1985), pp. 541-54. 420  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Figure 8.  Ratio of M3 to GDP, Korea, 1960-86 
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Source:  Economic  Planning Board, Major Statistics  of Korean Economy,  various  issues. 
offset to higher  real oil prices and an extra source of foreign exchange 
revenue. 
The late 1970s  upturn  of inflation  in Korea, as in Latin  America,  was 
in part  due to oil and  to the necessary  exchange  depreciation.  But  unlike 
Latin  America,  Korea made  a rapid  fiscal  and external  adjustment  even 
before the 1982  debt shock played itself out. Korea's ability  to restrain 
wages may be as important  here as the dampening  of external shocks Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  421 
through  its particular  trade  structure.  Wage  restraint  and  the large  share 
of trade  in GNP imply  that  real  exchange  rates  could  be moved at a lower 
inflation  cost and  with a more significant  macroeconomic  impact.29 
Another difference between Latin America and Korea may be the 
latter's  response  to interest  rate shocks. Since much  of Korea's external 
debt is private, the debt shock affected primarily  firms  rather  than the 
government  budget.  As a consequence,  the risk  of an inflationary  budget 
deficit did not arise, and the downward  pressure on real wages at the 
firm  level was much  stronger. 
Market  access, especially  to the United States, has been an important 
advantage  for Korean export-led growth. But other Asian NICs and 
Latin America  have the same opportunity.  One might  think that prox- 
imity  to the large  Japanese  market  would have been an advantage.  But, 
just as has the United States, Korea  has found  that market  substantially 
closed. 
We now turn to the policy questions. What is a structural  surplus, 
does Korea have one, should it be corrected, and what is the best way 
to do so? 
Does Korea Have a Structural External Surplus? 
In 1986, Korea had its first current  account surplus, amounting  to 
some 3 percent  of GDP. Before that, as figure  9 shows, the only time in 
the past quarter  century  that  Korea  had  come even close to balance  was 
in 1976-77. Otherwise, consistently large external deficits were the 
rule.30  Has that  pattern  now been reversed, and is a history  of surpluses 
in the making?  Certainly  it appears  that since the late 1970s  there has 
been a steady move toward  surplus,  with the surplus  actually  material- 
izing  in 1986. 
If the surplus  were to prove  transitory,  there  would  be nojustification 
for policy changes  to trim  it. But if it proves persistent, there may be a 
29. See Frederick  Jaspersen,  "Adjustment  Experience  and Growth  Prospects  of the 
Semi-Industrialized  Economies,"  Working  Paper  477  (World  Bank, 1981);  and  Jaspersen, 
"Adjusting  to External  Shocks:  The  Newly Industrialized  Developing  Economies  in 1974- 
76 and 1979-81"  (World  Bank, 1981),  for  an  accounting  framework  that  evaluates  external 
shocks  and  policy  responses. 
30. We  assume  the 1987  current  account  surplus  to be 4 percent  of GDP. 422  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Figure 9.  Korean External Balance, 1954-86a 
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Source:  International Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues. 
a. Computed  as percent  of GDP  and as a three-year  centered  moving  average.  The 1987  current  account  surplus 
is assumed  to be 4 percent  of GDP, and the 1987  nonfactor  current  account  surplus  is assumed  to be 7 percent  of 
GDP. 
b. The current  account  less net factor  payments  abroad. 
policy issue. At least it is worth asking  what the costs and benefits of a 
long-term  surplus  would be. And, to the extent that the surplus  is the 
result  of deliberate  policies, it is appropriate  to ask  whether  these policies 
are  justified  on a cost-benefit  analysis  of the surplus.  Hence the need for 
a closer look at what a structural  surplus  is and whether  Korea  has one. 
STRUCTURAL  SURPLUSES 
There  is no accepted definition  of a structural  surplus  in the external 
balance.  But a pragmatic  one will do. A structural  surplus  is one that  can Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  423 
Table 15.  Long-Term Foreign Saving Patterns, Germany, Japan, United States, Korea, 
1950-86 
Percent of GNP 
Country  1950_59a  1960-69  1970-79  1980-86b 
Germany  2.7  2.1  2.6  2.5 
Japan  0.1  0.2  0.8  1.9 
United  States  0.2  0.2  -0.5  -1.8 
Korea  -  8.7  -  10.1  -5.9  -  1.6 
Source: Net exports  in the national  income  accounts  from  IMF,  International Finantcial Statistics,  various  issues. 
a. Japan,  1952-59;  Korea, 1953-59. 
b. Japan,  1980-85. 
be expected  to persist  over a few years  if world  market  conditions  remain 
broadly  unchanged  and  the home economy does not experience  unusual 
shocks, such as earthquakes,  revolution,  or the like. 
Table 15 shows the long-term current account patterns of Japan, 
Germany, and the United States. The German pattern meets most 
obviously  the  definition  of a structural  surplus  . Japan  shows  an  increasing 
tendency  toward  surplus,  and  the United  States, a shift  toward  persistent 
deficits. 
The long-run  behavior of the current  account depends on national 
saving and investment. Investment opportuinities  in the world capital 
market,  public  finance, and demography  together  determine  whether  a 
country  is a net lender or a net borrower.  Although  long-term  current 
account  patterns  can be temporarily  obscured  by a boom or an external 
shock, such  interruptions  are  relatively  insignificant.  The role of demog- 
raphy in explaining saving and the current account remains almost 
unexplored,  except for an interesting  contribution  by George von Fur- 
stenberg.31  An emerging  demographic  life-cycle interpretation  of Japan 
argues that the shifting  age distribution  implies that at the turn of the 
century  the Japanese  population  will have a higher  average  propensity 
to spend. 
A nation's integration  with the world capital market determines 
whether  a given domestic saving is captured  for domestic investment, 
with a resulting  tendency  toward  current  account  balance, or whether  it 
is available  for investment abroad, with a resulting tendency toward 
foreign  lending  and  surpluses.  Integration  with the world  capital  market 
31.  See George M. von Furstenberg,  "Domestic  Determinants  of Net  U.S.  Foreign 
Investment,"  International Monetary Fund Staff Papers,  vol.  27 (December  1980), pp. 
637-78. 424  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
will tend to create structural  deficits  when investment  opportunities  are 
ample at home (say, because labor  is abundant)  and can be financed  in 
the world  capital  market. 
Absence of Ricardian  equivalence  also has a bearing  on the external 
balance. Long-term  swings in the government  budget will affect con- 
sumption spending and investment and hence influence the national 
saving-investment  balance.  A swing toward  budget  deficits, U.S. style, 
leads to  external deficits, while a  surplus policy leads to  external 
surpluses.  The same  phenomenon  may apply  at the level of firms  by way 
of undistributed  earnings  that are used for foreign  direct  investment. In 
countries  such as Germany,  where  firms  retain  earnings  and  use them  to 
invest abroad,  stockholders  may not spend fully the capital  gains and, 
as a result, the current account will show a surplus. Thus a foreign 
investment  motive, in the absence of Ricardian  equivalence, may well 
engender  persistent current account surpluses. The tendency will be 
stronger  the more  firms  rely on undistributed  earnings  and  the more  they 
rely on direct  ownership  of external  investments  as a means to exploit 
their monopolistic market positions. In a sense, then, these current 
account  surpluses  reflect  imperfections  of goods and assets markets. 
The saving-investment  interpretation  of the external  balance  can also 
be applied  to the question of how openness to trade affects the trade 
balance  and hence the current  account. Would  Japan,  with more open 
markets, have a smaller current account surplus? Not  necessarily. 
Germany is a relatively open economy whose current account has 
consistently shown a surplus. An opening by Japan would certainly 
increase  imports  and  thus  free resources, which could be used either  for 
production  of extra  exports or for increased  domestic absorption.  How 
the adjustment  would  occur depends  among  other  things  on fiscal  policy 
and public  sector spending  reactions. If a tax on saving  were to finance 
an expansion in public sector infrastructure  investment, the surplus 
might  vanish. But if there were no fiscal response, the long-run  current 
account  might  not change  much, and increased  imports  would be offset 
by higher  exports. 
THE  KOREAN  CASE 
Does Korea have a structural  surplus?  Table 16 shows the Korean 
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Table 16.  The Korean External Balance, 1960-86 
Percent  of GDP 
Measure  1960-69  1970-79  1980-86  1986 
Current  account  -9.1  -6.8  - 5.3  2.7 
Nonfactor  current  account  -  10.1  - 5.9  -  1.6  5.8 
Net factor payments  abroad  -  1.0  0.9  3.7  3.1 
Source: IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues. 
abroad,  and net factor payments, each expressed as a fraction  of GDP. 
Like figure  9 above, table 16 shows a pattern  of declining  deficits anid 
increasing  surpluses.  The figure,  especially, brings  out clearly how the 
oil shocks of 1974 and 1979-80 temporarily  set back this pattern of 
improvement.  But despite these shocks, the forces driving  the current 
account toward  surplus  were strong  enough to restore near-balance  in 
1977  and again in 1984-85. Three worldwide  economic developments 
helped  push  the current  account  into surplus  in 1986.  First, interest  rates 
declined  from  their  peaks  of 1982-83,  and  hence debt  service  fell sharply. 
Second, real oil prices and real commodity  prices declined after 1980. 
Third,  the decline of the dollar, and Korea's decision to stay with the 
dollar, helped improve Korea's international  competitiveness at the 
expense of Japan.  These three developments  were largely  responsible 
for Korea's 12  percent  growth  and $4.6 billion  current  account surplus 
in 1986.  Ro  estimates  that  absent  these three  benefits,  the current  account 
surplus  would  have been only around  $0.3 billion.32 
The emergence  of the surplus  can also be described  in terms  of saving 
and  investment.  The budget  improvement  since 1982  increases  national 
saving  and hence leads to an improvement  in the external  balance  that 
has not been offset by an increase  in investment. Since the high  growth 
is temporary,  being due to transitory  external  advantages,  it will have 
only a minor  effect on consumption,  which is linked at least in part to 
permanent  income. With  consumption  responding  sluggishly  to current 
real  income, personal  saving  increases. 
There is a short-term  structural  tendency toward current account 
improvement  in that  investment,  which  was concentrated  during  the late 
1970s  on capital  goods with  a significant  import  content,  has since shifted 
toward  projects  such  as construction  and  infrastructure  that  have  a much 
32. See S. T. Ro, "Favorable  External  Conditions  and  the Korean  Economy  in 1986" 
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lower import  content. But only in a context of unused  resources would 
an expenditure-switching  toward home goods lead to a long-term  in- 
crease in output  and national  saving. With  full employment,  the excess 
demand  for resources in the home goods sector will bring  about a real 
appreciation  that leads to a reduction of exports and an increase in 
imports.  To the extent that the current  account surplus  reflects at least 
in part  the shift  in investment,  the real  appreciation  process may  already 
be under  way, and  one significant  component  of the surplus  may thus  be 
merely  transitory. 
But  one reason  to think  that  Korea  may  be heading  toward  a structural 
surplus is that Korean firms may take the view that potential trade 
conflicts make it relatively unprofitable  to locate all new capacity in 
Korea and may invest directly  in target  markets  such as Europe or the 
United States. As a result, domestic investment  would decline without 
an offsetting fall in saving, and the current account would show a 
tendency  toward  surplus.  The National  Pension System that  will go into 
effect in 1988  may be regarded  as a forced saving  device. But its impact 
on national  saving  is estimated  to be small.33 
We conclude that Korea is likely to have a structural  balance in the 
external  account, perhaps  a small surplus.  The size is difficult  to judge, 
and some of the present surplus  is likely to be transitory.  After all, the 
national  saving rate in 1986  reached the highest level ever, and even if 
the trend  in saving  is upward,  part  of that  saving  is surely  transitory.  The 
next question  is whether  the structural  surplus  calls  for  corrective  policy. 
In considering  that  issue we emphasize  that  one must  look at the overall 
current account, not at bilateral  trade balances, the aggregate trade 
balance, or even the current  account  excluding  factor  payments. 
Policy Responses to the Structural Surplus 
There are two opposing schools of thought  about external  balances 
of developing  debtor  countries.  One, that export-led  growth  and reduc- 
tions in debt  burdens  are  desirable  strategies,  has been argued  forcefully 
by Corbo  and  Nam.34  The other, that  East Asian NICs' current  account 
33. See J. S.  Min, "The Master National Plan and its Socioeconomic Effects," 
Research  Monograph  8605  (Korea  Development  Institute,  1986). 
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surpluses  are a provocation  to a liberal  world trading  system and must 
be reduced, was espoused as the lowest common denominator  at the 
latest  economic  summit  and  has  become  a main  point  in U.S. commercial 
diplomacy. 
The question whether surplus countries should adjust is difficult. 
Policymakers  who look back on recent balance of payments  problems 
rightly  view an improvement  in the noninterest  current  account as an 
achievement  that should  not be readily  given up. They express concern 
that the surpluses merely represent cushions against external shocks 
and that it would be frivolous to sacrifice the protection they afford. 
Moreover,  they point out that it is much easier to give away surpluses 
by appreciation  or wage increases  than  to generate  them  by restraint  and 
depreciation.  Making  surpluses, when this becomes essential because 
of terms-of-trade  shocks or credit  rationing  in world  markets,  invariably 
involves inflation  and recession such as Korea experienced in 1980. 
Hence the tendency  to hang  on to surpluses. 
But there are two other sides to  the argument. First, on  strict 
economics, consumption  is the ultimate  objective: policies that favor 
growth  at the expense of current  consumption  cannot get high marks 
forever.  There  is little argument  for open-ended  surpluses  in the style of 
Japan  or Germany.  The only exception is the case where net foreign 
lending  reflects the transitory  demographic  effects of life-cycle saving 
when  the age structure  of the population  is changing.  Second, firms  and 
politicians  in the export markets  where the trade successes are scored 
oppose the invasion and ask at least for full reciprocity, meaning in 
particular  import  liberalization. 
Bela Balassa  and John Williamson  contend that Korea should  elimi- 
nate  its current  account surplus: 
We  have  argued  that  a continuing  surplus  is undesirable  at Korea's  present  stage 
of development.  It is unnecessary  in terms  of providing  Korea  with  an adequate 
safety  margin  against  foreign  shocks....  A continuing  surplus  would  create  an 
unnecessary  choice between limiting  investment,  and thereby  curtailing  future 
growth,  and  continuing  to hold consumption-and therefore  real wages-at  an 
unnecessary  low level.35 
The  same  view has  been  expressed  recently  in World  Financial  Markets: 
Chronic,  excessive surpluses serve no productive national  purpose. On the 
contrary,  they needlessly postpone  improvement  of domestic living standards 
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and,  by aggravating  international  trade  frictions,  jeopardize  continued  access to 
foreign markets.  Specifically, [Taiwan  and Korea] would be well advised-in 
their own self-interest-to adopt  fiscal policies that expand  domestic demand; 
allow significant  currency  appreciation  to boost purchasing  power and actual 
living  standards;  move rapidly  toward  import  regimes  with minimal  restrictions 
and  uniformly  low tariffs  of 10%  or  less; lift  exchange  controls  that  block  private- 
sector lending and investment overseas; and firee  their banking  systems and 
capital  markets  from  crippling  regulation.36 
These policy  suggestions  are a by-product of a search for a solution 
to the U.S.  trade problem, given the unwillingness of Congress and the 
President to agree on U.S.  fiscal policy and the unwillingness of Europe 
and Japan to expand.  Only a few  years  ago  Korea  was  urged in the 
direction of policy adjustments that would enable it to service the external 
debt and to be dropped from the list of problem debtors.  One way to 
interpret the new attitude is that Korea overshot the target. 
Two  questions  need  to  be  asked  at this  stage.  One is  whether  an 
adjustment in policies  should be pursued to trim the external surplus; 
the other, what particular policy should best be used. 
THE  DOUBTFUL  CASE  FOR  UNILATERAL  SURPLUS  REDUCTION 
The strongest argument in favor of surplus reduction is political. The 
United  States  is experiencing  extraordinary trade deficits.  Since  1980 
the  U.S.  manufacturing trade balance  with  developing  countries  has 
shifted by more than $50 billion. Part of these deficits has as a counterpart 
the surpluses of East Asian NICs,  including Korea,  as table 17 shows. 
The surpluses may be the outcome  of adjustments to the debt crisis or 
of superior trade performance. But one way or another they are a political 
problem.  To  avoid  costly  U.S.  trade restrictions  Korea  should  take 
measures to cut down the bilateral surplus. 
A more sophisticated version of this argument would emphasize that 
Korea, by staying with the dollar rather than the yen, undermines U.S. 
exchange  rate adjustment.  As Japan becomes  less  competitive  in the 
course of yen appreciation, Korea picks up the business  without much 
of an improvement  in the U.S.  external balance.  Again, for Korea to 
36. See Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Company,  World  Financial  Markets  (January  1987), 
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Table 17.  U.S.  Bilateral Trade Balance and Exchange Rates,  1981-86 
Billions  of dollars except  as noted 
Item  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
U.S. balance  with East Asian NICsa  -7.0  -8.2  -12.6  -21.4  -25.0  -30.8 
U.S. balance  with Japan  -  18.1  -  19.0  -21.7  - 36.8  - 49.7  - 58.6 
U.S. balance  with Korea  -0.4  -0.5  -  1.7  -4.0  -4.8  -7.1 
Exchange  rates (index,  1981  =  10O)b 
Won-dollar  100  107  114  118  128  130 
Yen-dollar  100  113  108  108  108  76 
Taiwan  dollar-dollar  100  106  109  107  107  103 
Sources:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis,  Survey  of  Current Blisitness, various 
issues;  and Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. 
a.  Hong Kong,  Singapore, Taiwan,  and Korea. 
b.  The exchange  rates for August  1987 are as follows:  Korea,  119; Japan, 64; Taiwan,  82. 
avoid  trade  restrictions,  there  needs  to be an improvement  in the bilateral 
trade  balance. 
These  political  arguments  have obvious  force. But  they make  the case 
for bilateral  adjustments  rather  than broad-based  policy moves. If the 
U.S. interest  focuses on the bilateral  trade  balance, then it is not clear 
that  broad,  overall  balance  of payments  adjustment  policies are  the most 
effective way to forestall U.S. policy action. On the contrary,  policies 
targeted  specifically  to increasing  imports  from the United States and 
reducing  exports to the United States would be more effective. For 
example,  special  incentives  might  be used to shift  imports  from  Japanese 
suppliers  to U.S. sources, especially in industries  where U.S. manufac- 
turers  would  be most  appreciative  and  hence  politically  most supportive. 
A more important  argument  against initiating  major  policy adjust- 
ments at this stage draws attention  to U.S. budget  balancing.  Over the 
next few years the United States will undoubtedly sharply reduce 
domestic demand  and the external deficit. It is therefore essential to 
consider Korea's adjustment  in the context of the realignment  of the 
world  economy  attendant  upon U.S. trade  and  budget  adjustment. 
The direct expenditure  effects of U.S.  budget correction may by 
themselves eliminate a good part of Korea's surplus. If Korea, by 
expansionary  policies or real appreciation,  eliminates  its surplus  over 
the next two years, before U.S. budget  cutting  actually  gets under  way, 
the U.S.  cuts would drive Korea's current account into deficit and 
require  a corrective  real  depreciation.  If fiscal expansion  had  been used 
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export industries  were losing their  markets.  Clearly  the Korean  adjust- 
ment question  cannot  be solved independently  of the U.S. expenditure 
cuts. The importance  of the U.S. market  for Korean exports (and the 
fact  that  Japanese  and  European  markets  are  substantially  closed) makes 
Korean adjustments dependent on  U.S.  policies and timing. As  a 
component  supplier  to other  countries  who in turn  export  to the United 
States, Korea also shares in their losses of exports in the course of a 
U.S. budget  cut. Moreover,  reduced  activity in third  countries  will also 
adversely  affect Korea's exports there. 
It is difficult  to quantify  the impact  of U.S. budget  cutting  on Korea. 
Total Korean exports in 1986  were $34.7 billion, of which $9.5 billion 
went directly to the United States. If indirect exports to the United 
States amount  to another  $5.5 billion,  a 7 percent  reduction  in U.S. total 
imports,  across the board, would reduce Korean  exports by $1 billion, 
not counting the reduced levels of demand  in third countries. Clearly 
this expenditure shock would not eliminate the present surplus, but 
disturbances  involving interest rates and oil could combine with the 
expenditure  shock to eliminate  most of it. The possible combination  of 
a dollar  collapse  and  attendant  increases  in  interest  rates,  real  commodity 
prices, and oil prices implies a major shock to the Korean external 
balance  that would certainly  be unwise to reinforce  by a premature  and 
difficult-to-reverse  dissipation  of the external  position. 
How to Adjust? 
If, the above arguments  notwithstanding,  Korea seeks some overall 
adjustment  in the balance of payments, how might it best make the 
adjustment?  Two approaches  are  possible:  expenditure  increases  versus 
expenditure  switching, on one hand, and policies toward  capital flows 
and capital  markets,  on the other  hand. 
CAPITAL  MOBILITY 
Although, as table 18 shows, nonbank  Korean residents at present 
have almost no external  deposit holdings, liberalizing  private  portfolio 
capital outflows is the least desirable way to reduce the surplus. The 
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Table 18.  Cross-Border Bank Deposits of Nonbanks by Residence of Depositor, 
Various Years, 1981-86 
Billions  of U.S.  dollars except  as noted 
Dollars per 
capita 
Countty  1981  1983  1985  1986  (1986) 
Argentina  6.4  7.9  8.5  8.5  274 
Brazil  3.5  8.1  9.8  11.7  86 
Mexico  9.4  12.7  16.1  15.8  199 
Venezuela  15.6  10.9  14.0  12.8  720 
Korea  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.7  17 
Italy  12.0  10.6  10.9  11.3  189 
France  12.7  11.8  11.0  13.5  244 
Japan  1.9  2.0  4.4  7.3  60 
Source:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues.  End-of-year  figures for each  year. 
readily undermines  exchange stability and emphasizes finance at the 
expense of productive  activity. Of course, these developments  do not 
occur independently  of poor budget  performance  and adverse shocks. 
But the case for the social benefits of hot money mobility remains 
doubtful.37 
Moreover,  liberalizing  capital  outflows  would  not seem to be the right 
policy if the concern is with an excessive current  account surplus. If 
capital  were to leave in response to a removal of capital controls, the 
consequence might  be balance of payments  difficulties  and a tendency 
for real  depreciation.  There  are better  ways than  private  capital  flows to 
use the capital  account to offset a current  account surplus.  Debt can be 
repaid or, better yet,  the current account can be  used to finance 
productive  Korean  direct  investment  abroad. 
Debt reduction  is of interest  because Korea, as shown in table 19, is 
a major  debtor  and hence remains  vulnerable  to interest  rate shocks or 
to credit rationing.  The group of countries experiencing recent debt 
rescheduling  problems  had  a debt-GNP  ratio  in 1986  of 54.8 percent  and 
a ratio  of debt  service  to exports  of 37.6  percent.  Countries  without  debt- 
37. See John  T. Cuddington,  "Capital  Flight:  Estimates,  Issues and Explanations," 
Princeton  Studies  in International  Finance,  58 (Princeton  University, 1986);  and  Rudiger 
Dornbusch,  "External  Debt, Budget Deficits and Disequilibrium  Exchange  Rates," in 
Gordon  W.  Smith  and  John  T.  Cuddington,  International  Debt  and  the  Developing 
Countries  (Washington,  D.C.: World  Bank, 1985),  reprinted  as "Overborrowing:  Three 
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Table 19.  Korea's External Debt,  1970, 1982, 1986 
Percent  except as noted 
Debt  measure  1970  1982  1986 
External  debt (billions  of dollars)  2.3  37.1  44.5 
Debt-GNP  ratio  27.8  52.4  46.8 
Debt service-GNP ratio  3.3  8.4  10.1 
Debt service-export  ratioa  18.5  20.6  22.9 
Source:  Estimates  for  1970 from  Yung Chul Park,  "Korea's  Experience  with  External  Debt  Management,"  in 
Gordon  W.  Smith and John T.  Cuddington,  eds.,  International  Debt  anid the Developinig  Countries  (Washington, 
D.C.:  World Bank,  1985), pp. 289-328;  estimates  for  1982 and 1986 from Korean Ministry of Finance. 
a.  Exports  of goods  and services. 
rescheduling  difficulties,  by contrast, showed for these two indicators 
ratios  of 32.5  percent  and 17.2  percent,  respectively. Korea  sits squarely 
between the two groups, looking better than other major  debtors and 
not as good as those countries without debt-service problems. These 
data suggest  that Korea  might  do well to pay off part  of the debt. 
Indebtedness  cannot be neglected  as an issue. Since Korea's debt is 
predominantly  short-term,  it is entirely  possible that although  interest 
can be paid, rescheduling  the principal  might  turn  out to be a problem. 
As World  Financial Markets worried out loud only a few years ago, 
"Korea is vulnerable  to a deterioration  in the climate  for LDC lending 
and to the phenomenon  of 'regionalization'-thus, Korea's access to 
credit could be crimped  by difficulties  in such neighboring  countries  as 
the Philippines."38  Needless to say, political developments in Korea, 
whether  domestic or in relation  to North Korea, or a turn  in the world 
oil and interest rate picture could change Korean creditworthiness 
rapidly.  All the experiences  of problem  debtors, and indeed  the Korean 
experience  as recently  as 1980-82,  indicate  that  external  finance  can dry 
up rapidly. 
What  of letting  private  capital  in?  That  would  not contribute  to solving 
the  overall  balance  of payments  problem  except  by increasing  the  upward 
pressure  on the real exchange  rate. The Chilean  miracle  ended in 1978- 
80, when an excess of private capital led to real appreciation  and a 
massive deterioration  in the current account that ultimately brought 
inflation,  unemployment,  and a breakdown  of the financial  system. 
The overriding  characteristic  of private  capital  flows, without much 
exaggeration,  is that capital  tends to come when it is unnecessary  and 
38. Morgan  Guaranty,  World  Financial Markets (March  1984),  p. 6. Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  433 
leave when it is least convenient. As a result it tends to increase the 
variability  of real exchange rates and introduces  avoidable  macroeco- 
nomic instability.  One cannot escape the impression  that Korea, under 
the impact of abundant  external capital, might lose its competitive 
exchange  rate,  overborrow,  and  ultimately  become  once again  a problem 
debtor.  Korea's investment  rate  is more  than  30 percent  of GNP. There 
is little  to suggest  that  capital  imports  are necessary  because capital  is in 
short  supply. 
FISCAL  EXPANSION 
The  argument  for  fiscal  expansion  as a means  of correcting  the external 
surplus  is also difficult  to make. It is true that the deficit is relatively 
small and certainly far from dangerous. Government  indebtedness is 
relatively  small,  and  deficit  finance  has  not been inflationary  in  the recent 
past. Thus the budget can certainly afford expansion. But it seems a 
very roundabout  way of reducing  the current  account surplus. Even 
though  the economy is open as judged  by the ratio  of trade  to GNP, the 
import  content of consumption  is relatively small, only twenty-three 
cents per dollar  of imports.  It would thus take a considerable  tax cut to 
have a significant  trade  impact.  To be more  cost effective, budget  action 
might  concentrate  on investment in areas where the import  content is 
much  higher.  But  one likely  target  of investment,  construction,  does not 
have high  import  content  and  another,  equipment,  could  further  expand 
the export  sector or promote  import  substitution,  which, as the current 
account  surplus  suggests, may already  be overdone. 
One fiscal action that should probably  be undertaken  independent 
of the external balance is a relaxation  of programs  of forced saving, 
which  have served  their  purposes  in mobilizing  saving  and  as balance  of 
payments  adjustment  policies. Welfare  gains can obviously be reaped, 
and  the lack of an external  constraint  makes such a move more  timely. 
REAL  WAGE  INCREASES  OR  REAL  APPRECIATION 
Korea  is involved  in two major  trading  relationships.  On one hand, it 
is positioned  in a trade  relation  with the United States and  Japan:  it is an 
alternative  supplier  in the U.S. market  and a supplier  of intermediate 
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relative  wages in dollars  of Korea and  Japan  therefore  have major  trade 
effects. On the other hand, Korea still competes with other developing 
countries, including  China, in traditional  export industries. A rise in 
Korean  wages in dollars  relative  to these countries  would have a major 
impact on competitiveness in labor-intensive  export industries.  These 
relations  must  be borne  in mind  in  judging  whether  Korean  increases in 
dollar wages are an appropriate  response to U.S. pressures to reduce 
the trade  surplus. 
A rise in  unit  labor  costs relative  to the United  States  and  Japan  would 
certainly reduce Korea's external surplus. Figure 10 shows the real 
exchange rate in manufacturing,  a measure that compares Korean 
wholesale prices in manufacturing  with a trade-weighted  average  of its 
trading  partners.  Reversing  some of the recent gain in competitiveness 
shown in the figure  would trim  the surplus  but might  not materially  help 
the United States. A unilateral real appreciation would strengthen 
Japan's  relative  position. There  would be trade  diversion  toward  Japan 
and  some protective  effect  for  the United  States. If Japanese  and  Korean 
exports are highly substitutable,  and if Japan rather  than the United 
States is the main marginal  supplier  in Korea, the United States may 
stand  to gain  relatively  little. 
Real  appreciation  could  also hinder  Korea's  efforts  to promote  infant- 
industry  exports. Through  its low level (and high growth rate) of real 
wages, Korea has been able to invest in gaining  export products and 
export markets.  Real appreciation  would diminish  this implicit  subsidy 
and break up highly efficient growth industries  on the export side. A 
much better way to adjust the external balance would be to reduce 
inefficient  import  protection. 
If exchange appreciation  is a bad idea, wage increases are worse. 
They have the same effect as exchange appreciation  but, in addition, 
they exert upward  pressure  on the price level. Clearly,  there is no need 
for inflation  as a by-product  of eliminating  an external  surplus. 
TRADE  LIBERALIZATION 
Korean  trade  remains  highly  protected  in a number  of areas,  including 
agriculture,  prospective growth industries  such as machine  tools, and 
industries  where  there  is no  justification  for  protection  other  than  history 
and politics. Much of this protection should be abandoned  as soon as 
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Figure 10.  Bilateral Real Exchange Rate between Korea and the United States 
and Korea's Real Effective Exchange Rate, January 1978-July  1987a 
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Guaranty. 
a.  The won-dollar exchange  rate as adjusted for changes  in wholesale  prices in manufacturing. The real effective 
won rate is a measure of wholesale  prices in Korea relative to a bilateral trade-weighted  average of wholesale  prices 
of major trading partners. 
and it is costly because it absorbs scarce resources in an unproductive 
fashion.  The immediate  effect of further  forceful  liberalization  would  be 
to raise  the standard  of living. 
What  would liberalization  do to the trade  balance?  In the short run, 
imports  would  increase.  The impact  on exports  would  be minor  because 
of a complete  system of tax drawbacks  that has been in effect since the 
1960s.  Thus  the short-run  effect would be to reduce  the trade  surplus.  It 
might  not, however, reduce trade  frictions  with the United States. For 
one thing,  the bilateral  U.S.-Korean trade  balance  might  not be greatly 
improved  by trade  liberalization  except in the area of agriculture.  And, 
more important,  the resources that would be freed by closing down or 
at least limiting  the expansion of inefficient  industries  would become 
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export sector would mean  a gain in real income, but it could also mean 
an increase in trade conflicts: the collective voice of threatened  U.S. 
import-competing  industries is always louder than that of successful 
U.S. exporters. 
Liberalization  does not mean that protection should be dropped 
altogether.  The Korean  experience  has amply  demonstrated  that  infant- 
industry  protection  pays. Protecting  new industrial  candidates  such as 
machine tools may draw objections from abroad, but it is altogether 
justified  on dynamic  efficiency  grounds. 
CLOUDS  ON  THE  HORIZON 
The discussion so far has assumed that Korea has a structural  and 
growing  external  surplus.  But that  judgment  may be premature.  In 1977 
Korea's external  balance was tending  toward  balance and a structural 
surplus.  That  process was interrupted  by the oil and  debt shocks and  by 
domestic instability  in 1980-81. Since then the surplus  has again been 
built  up. Butjust  as the events of 1979-83  overstated  the Korean  external 
balance problems, the surplus today may look better than it really is 
because of favorable  external  developments  that cannot  be expected to 
last. 
Already, rising oil and commodity  prices are lowering Korea's real 
income  and  worsening  the external  balance.  Commodity  prices  in  dollars 
have risen 22 percent  over the past year, while the price of oil has risen 
35 percent. The LIBOR rate has risen nearly a full percentage point 
since  the end of 1986. All these developments influence the external 
balance  with  a lag  and  help  temper  a strong  performance  in  manufacturing 
trade. Moreover, in the course of a further  dollar  decline, these devel- 
opments  are certain  to worsen further  Korea's external  balance. 
A crude estimate of the direct balance of payments effects of a 10 
percent  rise in oil and commodity  prices and a 100-basis-point  increase 
in the LIBOR  rate  is $1.1 billion.  It does not take much  to curtail  sharply 
the current  account surplus. 
An even more significant  development is labor unrest and wage 
pressure in the home economy. Wage policy has traditionally  been a 
mainstay  of Korea's  trade  performance.  The  timely  restraint  of excessive 
wage increases in the face of the external shocks has helped achieve 
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been changing  rapidly  and suddenly. With almost all major  exporting 
firms already involved in labor disputes in one form or another, the 
unrest is spreading  to medium-sized  and small firms  that supply com- 
ponents to exporting  firms. While it is not clear where the unrest will 
end, it is certain  that  the estimated  wage increases  of only 8 percent  now 
have to be revised upward  to 20 percent. Therefore,  the 1985-86  gain  in 
competitiveness,  already  dampened  by the 10  percent  won appreciation, 
will be mostly lost. 
The loss in competitiveness  from labor market  developments com- 
bines with rising  interest  rates and oil and commodity  prices to change 
substantially  the outlook  for Korea's  external  balance.  The  large  surplus 
of 1986 and early 1987 may not hold up for long, a prospect that is 
disconcerting  because of prospective U.S. budget  adjustment  that will 
also worsen  Korea's  trade  balance.  In view of these uncertainties,  major 
changes  in policy to eliminate  rapidly  the external  surplus  would be ill- 
considered  at this time. 
Concluding  Remarks 
Korea's  superior  growth  during  the past  twenty-five  years  was a result 
not of any single policy, but of different  policies applied at different 
times. When surplus labor and high unemployment prevailed, the 
government  opted for support  of labor-intensive  industries  and pushed 
education  programs  on a massive scale. When the competitive  edge in 
these industries  began  to be threatened,  support  switched  to heavy and 
chemical  industries.  When  excessive government  intervention  and mis- 
allocation  became  apparent,  the government  relaxed  some of its control 
over the economy. 
Government  clearly played the leading  role in the structural  adjust- 
ment. During  the early stages of industrialization,  exports were singled 
out with subsidies, credit, and an attractive  real exchange rate. When 
the situation  called  for more  capital-intensive  and technology-intensive 
industrialization,  import  restrictions  were provided  to generate  profit- 
ability  for infant  industries.  Monopolies  and  oligopolies  were created  to 
give the infants  time and scale economies, and tax and credit facilities 
helped  reinforce  the momentum.  In the 1980s, when the economy had 
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much  of the  control.  Trade  and  capital  markets  are  now  being  increasingly 
liberalized.  But  that  does not  mean  there  is no longer  an  industrial  policy. 
Now  the emphasis is on supporting  research and development and 
encouraging  small  and  medium-sized  firms. 
Confronted  with a large external surplus, Korea must find a policy 
response. Aggressive measures such as appreciation,  wage increases, 
capital account liberalization,  and fiscal expansion are not in order. 
Beyond measures  to reduce  inefficient  protection,  any major  balance  of 
payments action should await the final outcome of the present labor 
disputes and the U.S. budget  deficit  reduction.  Each is likely to reduce 
Korea's surplus exports significantly,  and the world macroeconomic 
developments  in interest  rates, oil, and commodities  may reinforce  that 
result. When  the U. S  . expenditure  cuts do occur it would, of course, be 
entirely  inappropriate  to deny them  by an offsetting  real  depreciation. 
These policy conclusions are uncomfortable  because, their common 
sense notwithstanding,  U.S.  policymakers somehow believe that the 
trade problem can be  solved without budget action. They do  not 
recognize  that  if the U.S. trade  deficit  were to vanish, the U. S. economy 
would be pushed  far  beyond  full employment,  and investment  would  be 
crowded  out. 
U.S. policymakers  are insisting on Korean adjustment.  With NICs 
more and more competing  with U.S. firms  in a wide range  of products, 
that insistence will only increase. What  is the proper  policy response? 
For an export-oriented,  poor economy like Korea, the major  asset in its 
growth  policy is access to the U.S. market.  The proper  policy response 
to current  and prospective trade pressures is to assure market  access 
even at a stiff price in terms  of adjustment  costs. Unfortunately,  Korea 
has relatively  little  influence  over U. S. general  trade  policy. Under  these 
circumstances, a plausible initiative would have to be bilateral. It is 
increasingly apparent that the existing commercial relations treaty, 
which dates from the 1940s, is in need of an overhaul. Korea might 
profitably  seek a new arrangement  with the United States that includes 
two emphases, one, a Bilateral Investment Treaty and the other, a 
Bilateral  Free Trade  Area. 
The advantage  of the policy is to assure preferential  and permanent 
access to a very substantial  market.  It is not without adjustment  costs 
for Korea. But these costs fall far short  of those that  would be imposed 
if the U.S.  market actually closed in the way that Europe now is 
increasingly  closing herself  to external  competitors. Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  439 
APPENDIX 
The Main Stages  of Recent Economic History 
KOREAN  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  since the 1950s can be divided into four 
periods defined  by different  policy objectives. They are, respectively, 
the reconstruction  of the economy after the Korean  War,  the outward- 
looking  development  of the 1960s,  the industrialization  campaign  of the 
1970s  centered on heavy and chemical industry,  and the liberalization 
period  of the 1980s.  We briefly  review each in turn.  Table  A-I details  the 
main  economic indicators  from 1970  to 1986. 
Reconstruction:  1953-61 
After the Korean War the country faced the economic instability 
characteristic  of a poor  country,  namely,  rampant  inflation  and  a scarcity 
of basic consumption  goods. Lacking  both experience and an efficient 
administrative  structure,  policymakers  turned  to short-term  relief mea- 
sures rather than long-term economic  planning. 
Industrial  policy focused on import  substitution  of nondurable  con- 
sumer  and intermediate  goods. But a small domestic market  and high 
capital  requirements  limited  the potential  of these policies. In addition, 
Korea had a national saving rate of only 5 percent, much too low to 
finance reconstruction.  Foreign  aid provided  much  of  the  necessary 
finance.  GNP growth  averaged  3.7 percent, while per capita income in 
this period grew at a rate of only 0.7 percent. Even though progress was 
slow, the 1950s  laid  the  groundwork  for  growth  by expanding  educational 
facilities  at all  levels and  creating  a manufacturing  base needed  to launch 
an export-promotion  strategy. Land redistribution  improved income 
distribution. 
Outward-Looking  Strategy: 1962-71 
The First  Five-Year  Economic  Development  Plan  altered  basic goals 
and  economic  strategy,  switching  the focus of the Korean  economy  from 0  0 
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import  substitution  to export promotion.  This outward-looking  devel- 
opment  strategy  was designed  to utilize  the nation's  comparative  advan- 
tage in labor-intensive  manufactured  goods. It aimed to create the 
economic  base for industrialization  and self-sustained  growth. 
Korea's only resource was an abundant  labor force that was well- 
educated  and diligent,  partly  due to the influence  of Confucianism.  The 
government  exploited this comparative  advantage  by fostering  exports 
of labor-intensive  goods. 
To make Korean goods more price competitive in international 
markets,  the won was devalued by almost 100 percent, and a unitary 
managed  (floating)  exchange  system was instituted  in 1965.  The govern- 
ment  also began  to provide  a variety  of tax exemptions,  tariff  rebates  on 
materials  imported  for export production,  easy credit for export com- 
panies,  reduced  rates  on public  utilities  for  exporters,  simplified  customis 
procedures,  and  accelerated  depreciation  allowances  for exporters. 
Financing  beyond the scale of foreign aid was needed to implement 
this export-based  strategy. Several measures  were adopted  to raise the 
necessary  funds, including  government  guarantees  for qualified  foreign 
loans to private Korean companies. Real deposit interest rates were 
increased  to raise the low national  saving rate and thus help close the 
saving  gap. The saving  rate in fact increased  from  3.2 percent  in 1965  to 
14.5 percent  in 1971,  although  it is not clear whether  this increase was 
caused by higher interest rates. To control resource allocation the 
government  repossessed a major  portion  of equity shares  of nationwide 
commercial  banks  in 1961  and  thereafter  exercised  tight  control  over the 
lending  activities of these institutions.39  To control capital allocation, 
the government  confiscated  a major  portion  of equity shares  of national 
banks. 
During  the first  five-year  plan period  (1962-66), exports quadrupled, 
while  imports  less than  doubled.  During  the second five-year  plan  period 
(1967-71), exports grew more than fourfold while imports little more 
than  tripled.  Fueled by the growth  in exports, the economy maintained 
a high  GNP growth  rate, averaging  8.7 percent during  the two periods, 
and per capita  growth averaged  6.9 percent, considerably  higher  than 
the 0.7 percent  of the reconstruction  period. 
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Heavy and Chemical Industrialization:  1972-79 
In the  1970s, Korea faced political and economic changes that 
convinced policymakers to promote heavy and chemical industries. 
Politically, the United States announced that it wanted to reduce its 
defense commitments  to Korea, prompting  the Korean  government  to 
build up defense-related  heavy industries. Economically, the first oil 
crisis showed  Korea's  vulnerability  to external  shocks. Growing  protec- 
tionism after the decline of the Bretton-Woods  system and high prices 
for imported grain also forced Korea to  reassess its development 
strategy.  Furthermore,  because  other  developing  countries  with  cheaper 
labor began to enter labor-intensive  industries,  Korean products  were 
losing their price competitiveness.  Given these external  changes, poli- 
cymakers  began  to modify  their strategy  by promoting  import-substitu- 
tion industries, particularly  heavy and chemical industries, and by 
increasing  the output  of the rural  sector. 
The biggest  obstacle  to the heavy and  chemical  industrialization  drive 
was the huge capital  requirement  of these industries.  Public employee 
pension  funds  were used to mobilize  resources  for the investment  drive, 
and a substantial  amount  of private saving was directed toward these 
sectors by the National Investment Fund. These funds were then 
channeled,  often at negative  real  interest  rates, into heavy and  chemical 
projects such as shipbuilding,  automobiles,  steel products, nonferrous 
metals, and petrochemicals. Moreover, banks were urged to make 
additional  loans available,  again  at artificially  low interest  rates. 
Since  these industries  enjoyed  scale  economies  and  since  the  domestic 
economy was small, the government  granted  monopolistic  production 
to certain companies. A number  of firms financed  by the government 
rapidly  became very large, challenging  multinationals  in size and often 
becoming  multinationals  themselves. 
Another  area of concern was the agricultural  sector. Because of the 
higher  productivity  in the manufacturing  sector, the income  differences 
between rural  residents and urbanites  became acute. The government 
sought  to help  agriculture  by investments  and  loans and  by a costly grain 
price support  system that financed  the discrepancy  between high pro- 
ducer prices and the lower price paid by consumers. These measures 
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While these policies contributed  to the average 9.7 percent annual 
real GNP growth rate between 1972 and 1979, they had side effects: 
excessive investment in heavy industries, underdevelopment  of light 
industries,  lack  of competition  due  to government  controls,  overreliance 
on external  markets,  and  high  inflation.  Between 1972  and 1979,  inflation 
averaged 18 percent as opposed to only 12 percent between 1962  and 
1971. 
Liberalization:  1980-Present 
The problems  of the heavy and chemical  industrialization  drive gave 
rise to a reorientation  of policies to emphasize  inflation  fighting,  liberal- 
ization, and a shift in emphasis away from the heavy and chemical 
industry.  Inflation  reduction  was to be achieved  by control  of the money 
supply. A freeze on new projects in the overexpanded heavy and 
chemical  industry  and  the allocation  of credit  toward  light  industries  and 
small  firms  would  shift  resources.  Finally,  selective import  liberalization 
would  initiate  an opening  of the economy to enhance  competition. 
The second oil crisis, political instability, and possibly the shift in 
policies caused the economy to experience  a sharp  decline in output  in 
1980.  The fall of GNP by 4.8 percent in that year was the first  and only 
economic  contraction  in modern  Korean  history. 
Since 1981  policies have kept inflation  low. Monetary  control and a 
sharp  shift in the budget, combined  with favorable external shocks in 
1985-86,  helped  achieve that result. The government  budget  deficit  as a 
ratio  of GNP dropped  from  4.7 percent  in 1981  to just 1  percent  in 1985. 
In addition, wage increases were restrained. A Fair Trade Act was 
initiated  to reduce  monopolistic  practices, and import  liberalization  got 
under  way, as did liberalization  of the financial  sector. Manufacturers 
had previously been shielded from international  competition through 
import  barriers.  But a growing  trade surplus  invited pressure  from the 
United States to move ahead  with liberalization.  A number  of markets 
were in fact opened, raising the import liberalization  ratio from 68 
percent  in 1979  to 92 percent  in 1986.  Tariff  rates were reduced  from 39 
percent in 1978  to only 20 percent in 1986.40  Also, foreign investment 
regulations  began  to be relaxed. 
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The period since 1981, world recession and high interest rates not- 
withstanding, has been very successful. Growth rates averaged 8.4 
percent, and, with the help of favorable  external  price shocks, inflation 
has been practically  eliminated.  But 1986  brought  not only 12.5  percent 
growth,  but  also a new challenge.  For  the first  time  in the modern  Korean 
history, the saving rate exceeded the investment ratio, and hence the 
current account balance turned from a chronic deficit to a $5 billion 
surplus. Comments 
and Discussion 
Susan M.  Collins: Rudiger Dornbusch and Yung Chul Park have 
provided  a useful and stimulating  paper. They discuss both the role of 
policy in South Korea's impressive economic development and the 
appropriate  policy responses to  Korea's current "problem": large 
external  surpluses.  The paper  reaches two conclusions, both of which I 
found convincing. First, it casts wages, investment, and government 
intervention  in the lead roles in Korea's "growth  policy," with macro- 
economic policies as the supporting  actors. Second, it argues against 
moves to cut Korea's overall current  account surplus,  concluding  that 
U.S. protectionism  is better dealt with through  bilateral  Korea-U.S. 
trade  arrangements. 
While I agree with the thrust of the paper, I think that there is an 
important  omission in the theme and the conclusions because so little 
emphasis  is placed on the role of saving. In contrast  to the recent U.S. 
experience, the trend in Korean saving has been a rapid  increase, and 
this increase  has been one of the keys to Korea's success. 
The authors  can claim that mention  of saving "is in there." And it is 
(see table 13), along  with a wealth of other  interesting  facts and figures. 
But in synthesizing  the many pieces, the first half of the paper gives 
surprisingly  little attention to integrating  the intertemporal  issues of 
saving, current account imbalance, and external borrowing  into the 
discussion  of wages and productivity-even  though  external surplus  is 
the focus of the second half  of the paper. 
In  the same  vein, the  authors  use the  Ricardian  trade  model  to illustrate 
their  points about  wages and  labor  productivity.  This is fine, but it only 
tells part  of Korea's story. At the end of my comments, I would like to 
show that it is not difficult  to extend the model to two periods so as to 
incorporate  intertemporal  issues, and  to give additional  analytic  content. 
I will summarize  the main  arguments  in the paper  as I go along. 
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The authors  describe Korea's growth strategy as having  four inter- 
related components:  labor, investment, productivity,  and wages. The 
hard-working  and  well-educated  work  force, together  with high  rates of 
investment, led to rapidly  growing labor productivity.  Nominal wage 
restraint  plus  productivity  growth  enabled  Korea  to achieve  the enviable 
combination  of increased  competitiveness  and  real  wage gains. 
They argue  that these four components  were supported  by sensible 
macroeconomic  policies and active interventionism.  Taxes have risen 
relative to income, providing  noninflationary  finance for government 
expenditures. Fiscal deficits and monetary growth have both been 
moderate. With the exception of a few years in the late 1970s, the 
government  maintained  competitive  exchange  rates. 
The analysis  also provides  a convincing  counterargument  to the view 
that market  liberalization  is a necessary prerequisite  for growth. Until 
recently, the government  maintained  pervasive trade restrictions and 
subsidies as well as control  over the allocation  of domestic and  foreign 
credit. Korea  shows clearly  that  government  intervention  can work  well 
if done properly.  I agree  with  the authors  that  these are some of the most 
important  lessons that Korea has to teach about successful growth 
policy. 
Is this a new development  strategy?  The authors  provocatively  argue 
that Korean growth policy combines elements from Germany,  Japan, 
and  Brazil,  and  that, in fact, there  is little we have not seen before. Like 
Germany  and Japan, Korea has low wages with high investment and 
productivity  growth. As in Japan, there has been active government 
intervention through credit markets. Like Brazil, Korea combines 
protection  of infant  industries  with subsidization  of exports. 
Although  the discussion of the similarities  is interesting,  the paper 
does not pull together some of the most important  lessons from Korea 
precisely because too little attention is paid to the differences. The 
authors  do mention  that  neither  Japan  nor  Germany  ran  current  account 
deficits  or accumulated  external  debts during  industrialization.  In addi- 
tion, exports remained  a relatively  constant  fraction  of income in both 
countries. Korea's experience is strikingly  different,  and this warrants 
further attention, especially because other developing countries are 
more  likely to resemble  Korea. 
Both Germany and Japan began their industrializations  with high 
fixed  investment  rates, 18.7  percent  in Germany  in 1951  and 19.8  percent 
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However, both countries,  and  especially  Japan,  began  with high  domes- 
tic saving  rates. 
In contrast, Korea was faced with declining aid flows in the early 
years of industrialization.  Domestic saving was less than 6 percent of 
GDP  in 1963.  A major  component  of Korea's first  five-year  plan was to 
mobilize  foreign  borrowing  so as to finance  investment.  The  government 
instituted a successful system of exchange guarantees to  stimulate 
foreign  borrowing. 
After an initial  rise, investment  rates remained  a relatively  constant 
share  of income in both Germany  and Japan  (23-26 percent and 29-30 
percent, respectively). Korea began with a relatively low investment 
rate (13 percent during the first five-year plan, 1962-66), which has 
increased  with each successive plan, to 32 percent  during  1984-86. But 
despite a dramatic  rise in domestic saving, Korea accumulated  a $12.8 
billion  current  account  deficit  over 1965-79. 
In this context, Korea's export  orientation  looks very different  from 
Germany's. In Germany, the ratio of exports to income remained  at 
about 20 percent throughout  the industrialization.  In Japan, the ratio 
remained  constant  at 11  percent.  However, no problem  emerged  because 
these countries  did not need to repay  external  debts. 
Two major  parts of Korea's success are that investment  was effec- 
tively channeled  into  rapidly  growing  exports,  which  rose from  9 percent 
of income in 1965  to 37 percent in 1980, and that domestic saving has 
risen  more  quickly  than  investment.  Korea's  saving  performance  emerges 
as one of the keys to Korea's  success. Without  the saving,  the continued 
investment  and productivity  gains would not have been possible. The 
issue is critical  but receives little attention  in the paper. 
There are a number of unusual aspects of Korean saving. Unlike 
many  other debtor  countries  where current  account deficits have been 
reduced  by slashing  investment,  current  account  improvement  in Korea 
comes as saving  rises. Investment  is never cut but consistently  exceeds 
the  target  from  the five-year  plans, even during  crisis years such  as 1980- 
81. (The planned  investment rates were 25.9 percent and 26 percent, 
while  the actual  rates  were 32 percent  and 30 percent.) 
Furthermore,  most of the movements in Korean saving come from 
the  household  sector, and  not  from  the government  or corporate  sectors. 
Current  account  deficits  (for  example, after  each of the oil shocks) have 
been associated  with plunges  in household  saving. The 1986-87  surplus 
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The authors  attribute  the surplus  to an improvement  in the budget  as 
well as to increased  private  saving.  However, I can find  little support  for 
this claim in the data. Most of the budget  improvement  occurred  much 
earlier:  the deficit was reduced  from more than 4 percent of output in 
1982  to 1.6 percent in 1983, mainly through  the privatization  of some 
public  enterprises.  In fact, there  was a slight  deterioration  in the budget 
between 1985  and 1986,  the first  year of current  account surplus. 
The movements  in Korean  household  saving  are well explained  by a 
simple  framework  that distinguishes  between permanent  and transitory 
(disposable)  income.1  Estimates for the marginal  propensities  to save 
are 0.12 and 0.45, respectively. This saving function implies that the 
ratio of  saving to  income will rise with income and that upward 
(downward)jumps  in  the saving  rate  will  be associated  with  unexpectedly 
high (low) income  growth. 
The analysis  of saving  provides  a strong  reason to believe that much 
of Korea's current  account surplus  is transitory,  arising  from very high 
growth rates (12.5 percent in 1986). Not all of the data required  for a 
careful  sectoral  decomposition  of 1986  saving  are available.  However, a 
rough calculation attributes  about 23 percent of the 1986 surplus to 
temporarily  high  income  growth  rates.2 
Finally, I will end my comments  by sketching  an analytic  framework 
that seems particularly  appropriate  for Korea. The accepted facts are 
that Korea borrowed  heavily to invest in the first  stage of industrializa- 
tion. Investment  has paid off through  rapid  labor productivity  growth, 
making Korea competitive in an expanding range of products and 
enabling  her to begin  repaying  the external  debts. Wages  have remained 
relatively  low throughout. 
1. See Susan M. Collins and W. A.  Park, "External Debt and Macroeconomic 
Performance  in Korea"  (Harvard  University  and  National  Bureau  of Economic  Research, 
1987),  for further  discussion  of this empirical  saving  equation. 
2. To calculate  this figure,  I assumed  that  4 percent  of the 12.5  percent  real  growth  in 
1986  was perceived  as transitory.  (The  average  growth  rate  over 1981-86  was 8.7 percent.) 
The ratio  of household  disposable  to total  income  was assumed  to be 72 percent  (the 1982- 
85 average).  Finally, the ratio  of 1985  to 1986  income  is 89 percent.  Thus, the transitory 
component  of 1986  disposable  income as a share of 1986  GDP was approximately  0.26 
(0.04 x  0.72 x  0.89 =  0.26). Multiplying  by the marginal  propensity  to save out of 
transitory  income (0.45) gives an estimate of  1.15 percent as the household saving 
attributable  to transitory  income  growth  as a share  of GDP.  The figure  is about  23 percent 
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The paper uses the Ricardian  model with a continuum  of goods to 
make sense of the empirical  linkages  between wages, productivity,  and 
competitiveness. In particular,  it neatly resolves the puzzle of how 
Korea could have increased competitiveness  while average unit labor 
costs were rising.  The framework  also nicely highlights  why the United 
States would be sensitive to technological  improvement  in Korea that 
squeezes U.S. workers out of producing  some products that are now 
produced  in Korea. 
However, the framework omits important  intertemporal  aspects. 
These  can  be incorporated  with  a two-period  version,  using  a very similar 
diagram  to figure  3 in the paper.  There  are  two extensions:  borrowing  in 
the first  period  to be repaid  in the second and the trade-offs  introduced 
by investment-lower initial  relative  wages with future  payoffs. 
First, suppose that Korea, the home country, borrows in the first 
period  and repays (plus interest)  in the second. The analysis is familiar 
from the transfer  problem, with relative wages as the terms of trade.3 
Korea's relative wage will rise or fall in each period depending on 
whether  there is a rise or a fall in the world demand  for Korean labor. 
When  the  countries  have  identical  preferences  and  there  are  no nontraded 
goods, the first-period  borrowing  and second-period  repayment  will not 
change  relative  wages or the patterns  of production-these transfers  do 
not shift  the OB curve, which represents  equilibrium  in the world  labor 
market. 
The second extension is to assume that technical progress in the 
second period  depends  on investment  in the first.  There  are many  ways 
to incorporate  investment. A simple one is to assume that some U.S. 
workers  are allocated to a separate "investment  goods" sector in the 
first  period,  with  workers  receiving  the same  wage  in both  sectors. Korea 
takes  over  the investment  goods sector  in the second  period.  The  Korean 
government  designates investment in each period exogenously. The 
approach  captures  the point made  in the paper,  that Korean  investment 
has had a large  import  content (that  is, there has been demand  for non- 
Korean  labor),  but has recently shifted  towards  construction  and other 
domestic  outputs. 
3. See the discussion  of the transfer  problem  in Rudiger  Dornbusch,  Stanley  Fischer, 
and Paul Samuelson, "Ricardian  Trade and Payments Theory with a Continuum  of 
Goods,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 67 (December  1977),  pp. 823-39. 450  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
The  extension  has  two effects. The  equilibrium  in  both  periods  without 
investment  is at point  E in figure  3. With  investment,  there  is a rightward 
shift  in the first-period  OB  curve. All, not part,  of the investment  income 
is spent on goods produced  in the United States. The net effect is a shift 
in  world  demand  from  Korean  to American  workers  that  reduces  Korea's 
relative wage. Because some American  workers produce investment 
goods, the rest are concentrated  over a smaller  range  of products. The 
first-period  equilibrium  is at a point  along  A(z) to the right  of E. 
In the second period, OB shifts to the left, and A(z) shifts to A'(z). 
The amount  of the shift  will depend  on the amount  of investment  and  on 
the link  between investment  and  technical  progress. 
Investment  lowers Korea's  first-period  standard  of living.  The payoff 
comes in the second period when investment goods are no longer 
imported.  The world  demand  for Korean  labor  rises, increasing  Korea's 
relative wage. What  happens  to the range of goods Korea produces is 
ambiguous,  but it may certainly expand. In any case, the investment 
goods sector in the United States will shrink.  The simple model I have 
discussed could  be extended  in many  directions. 
In summary,  this paper contains a wealth of interesting  facts and 
figures, and the points it makes are good ones. What it does not do is 
devote sufficient  attention  to the intertemporal  factors in Korea's suc- 
cessful development, in particular  to the roles of saving and external 
borrowing  in  financing  investment.  A two-period  version  of the  Ricardian 
model used by the authors  presents  a tractable  and intuitive  framework 
that can integrate  intertemporal  issues with the issues of wages and 
productivity  emphasized  in the paper. 
Vittorio Corbo: Rudiger Dornbusch and Yung Chul Park present a 
provocative  paper  dealing  with two related  issues: an interpretation  of 
Korea's growth performance  and an evaluation of whether Korea's 
recent current  account  surplus  is structural. 
I agree with much of the paper, particularly  the central  recommen- 
dation  of the second part  that  Korea  should  use part  of the  freedom  given 
by the current  surplus  to continue  the rationalization  of its trade  regime, 
eliminating  some of the extreme cases of import-substitution  inefficien- 
cies in the agricultural  sector, as well as in some branches  of manufac- 
turing.  Given the large  investment-GNP  ratio  and  the concern  about  the 
external debt, a part of  the surplus could be used to  reduce this 
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I am going to concentrate  my remaining  comments  on points  where I 
have some disagreement  with the authors. Dornbusch  and Park single 
out four  factors that account  for Korea'  s growth: 
-The  labor  force is better educated  and works harder  than those in 
most developing  countries.  Hourly  wages are lower than  those in newly 
industrialized  countries  like Taiwan  and Singapore. 
-People  save and borrow wisely, and policies are active, but not 
grossly misdirected. 
-Budget  deficits are moderate,  and the real effective exchange rate 
rarely  gets out of line. 
-The  outward-oriented  growth  strategy  has been more  conducive  to 
growth  than  the typical  import-substitution  model  of the Latin  American 
countries. 
The first  two of these arguments  are not convincing.  The labor  forces 
of Argentina  and Uruguay  are  better  educated  than  the Korean  one, and 
hourly  wages are  lower in Argentina  and  Uruguay  than  in Korea. On  the 
second point, as the authors  themselves recognize, the high saving can 
be explained by standard  macroeconomic variables, such as current 
income, the growth of income, inflation,  and, sometimes, real interest 
rates. All these characteristics  are the result of what may be the most 
important  factors  that differentiate  Korea  from  most of Latin  American 
countries:  low inflation,  a stable real exchange rate, and an outward- 
oriented trade strategy. The stable macroframework  and the export- 
expansion bias of policies (and the avoidance of the extreme import- 
substitution  bias typical of Latin  American  countries)  have contributed 
much  to the favorable  performance  of the Korean  economy. 
In Korea, growth  has not been as smooth as indicated  in the paper. 
Indeed,  during  the period  of 1973-80,  which is mentioned  only briefly  in 
the paper,  Korea  moved away from  the successful policies of the 1960s. 
The performance  of this period  shows clearly  the importance  of a stable 
macroframework  and the avoidance of an extreme import-substitution 
bias in economic policies. 
During  1973-80,  Korea  adjusted  its development  strategy,  embarking 
on an enormous  investment  effort  in the heavy and chemical  industries, 
with the aim  of strengthening  the country's  industrial  structure.  Large- 
scale investment  projects  in these industries  were encouraged  through 
special tax incentives, preferential  credit allocation, and negative real 
interest  rates  in a system dominated  by widespread  credit  rationing.  On 
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terms of trade  following the first oil shock (terms  of trade deteriorated 
30.3 percent  between 1972  and 1975)  was more  than  compensated  for by 
the expansionary aggregate demand policies that resulted from the 
expansion of investment and expansionary  monetary policy. A large 
foreign-debt-financed  current account deficit resulted, reaching 10.9 
percent  of GNP in 1974.  Heavy foreign  borrowing  sustained  an average 
annual  rate of growth  of GNP of 8.7 percent  during  1973-80. However, 
external debt grew at an annual average rate of 28.8 percent. Not 
surprisingly,  inflation  accelerated,  with wholesale price index inflation 
reaching 18.8 percent in 1979. As the nominal  exchange rate was kept 
fixed from 1974 to  1979, with domestic inflation much higher than 
international  inflation,  the real  effective exchange  rate  appreciated  close 
to  24 percent. Export growth suffered, and output growth slowed 
substantially.  To correct this situation  Korea embarked  on a compre- 
hensive adjustment  program  in the spring  of 1979;  the program's  main 
objectives were to  restore macroeconomic balance and to  resume 
growth. Those objectives have been met, as inflation  disappeared  and 
growth  was restored,  while for the first  time in modern  times Korea  has 
been achieving  current  account  surpluses. 
The main  lesson of Korea's  experience  is that  in countries  with  a good 
human capital base, a stable macroeconomic  framework  and a pro- 
export bias of economic policies are the two most important  sources of 
sustainable growth. Latin American countries have provided much 
evidence on the negative  effect of not following  such policies. 
General  Discussion 
John Williamson disagreed with the authors' conclusions that a 
substantial  balance of payments surplus, such as the recent level of 
around $5 billion a year, was an appropriate  target for Korea. He 
reasoned that domestic rather than foreign investment should be a 
priority  for Korea and that real wages and consumption  were relatively 
low and could be expanded. Furthermore,  Williamson  doubted that 
adverse shocks to the trade  balance, such as restrictive  fiscal policy in 
the United States or an increase in oil prices, would be great  enough  to 
warrant  aiming for a large balance of payments surplus as insurance 
against  such shocks. He reasoned  that if such shocks created  a balance Rudiger Dornbusch  and  Yung Chul Park  453 
of payments deficit, Korea could rely upon international  borrowing 
because it has reestablished  its creditworthiness,  and its debt-export 
ratio is in an acceptable range. Williamson also disagreed with the 
authors' presumption  that global coordination  can be dismissed for a 
smaller  country like Korea whereas it is relevant for a larger  country 
like Japan. Indeed, he argued  that a country like Korea may be more 
vulnerable  to retaliation  and sanctions  if its external  balance  is seen as 
out of line. Overall, he concluded that the goal for Korea should be a 
current  account  balance. 
A number  of participants  addressed  the issue of how to reduce the 
current  account surplus,  assuming,  with Williamson,  that such a reduc- 
tion is desirable. Stanley Fischer questioned  the authors'  prescription 
for establishing  a bilateral  free trade  area  between Korea  and  the United 
States, noting that Israel now regards its open trade with the United 
States as disadvantageous. With legal barriers  removed, the United 
States has been able to assure its access to Israeli  markets,  while Israel 
has continued  to encounter  significant  barriers  in U.S. markets.  Fischer 
concluded that Korea might lose more than it gained from a similar 
agreement. Williamson  reasoned that trade liberalization  would be a 
good way to reduce the surplus, and further  recommended  that Korea 
bring  about a real appreciation  of the won. In doing so, he favored a 
nominal  appreciation  of the won as opposed to a rise in nominal  wages 
because a large  nominal  wage increase  could increase  wage demands  in 
the future  even if they were not warranted  by international  competitive- 
ness. Williamson  argued  further  that expenditures  should  be increased 
either  through  fiscal  policy  or  by introducing  consumer  credit  to stimulate 
consumption. 
Robert  Gordon  found the role of investment  in promoting  growth  in 
Korea unclear from the data the authors presented. The investment- 
GDP  ratio  increased  dramatically  after 1973,  but the growth  rate of real 
GDP  declined  from 10.3  percent  in the decade  before 1976  to 6.4 percent 
in the subsequent decade. Dornbusch replied that this inconsistency 
may be due, in part, to revisions of the national  income accounts that 
were made  for 1970  onward,  and that comparisons  were also somewhat 
sensitive  to the end point  years that  were used. In analyzing  the sources 
of growth,  a slower though still substantial  rate of productivity  growth 
accounts  for the slowdown in GDP growth  between 1963-72  and 1972- 
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William  Branson  suggested  that more attention  be paid to the policy 
change  that  occurred  at  the end  of the 1970s  and  the subsequent  problems 
that arose. During  the 1970s,  Korea  followed a policy of credit subsidy 
for export-oriented  or heavy industries,  with the result  that the nonsub- 
sidized industries  had to borrow  at higher  rates. When this policy was 
relaxed, many firms in the previously favored sectors went bankrupt 
due to overcapitalization  while many  firms  in the other sectors reduced 
employment  in order  to increase  capital  intensity.  Both sectors, Branson 
concluded,  experienced  problems  once the credit-constraint  system  was 
removed.  Dornbusch  responded  that  many  of the  problems  in  this  period, 
in industries  such as chemicals, resulted  from the oil crisis rather  than 
from  the development  policy. Stanley  Fischer observed  that the data  in 
the paper  on income  distribution  did not include  an analysis  of the profit 
share.  He reasoned  that  a more  complete  analysis  of income  distribution 
would assign profits  to the incomes of individuals  and might alter the 
inferences  shown in the paper. 